public right, suffers special damage peculiar to himself from the interference with the public right.

POWER—DURATION OF POWER - ABSOLUTE VESTING OF ESTATE WHICH IS SUBJECT TO A POWER—LUNATIC.

In re Jump, Galloway v. *Hope* (1903) 1 Ch. 129. A testator had devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to his executors in trust for his only daughter for life, and after her death in their discretion and of their uncontrollable authority to manage and administer his estate and effects and apply so much as they should think fit for the maintenance or otherwise for the personal benefit of his grandchildren during their lives, whether infants or adults, and whether competent or incompetent to give a discharge, and on the death of the grandchildren to divide the estate among the issue of the grandchildren in equal shares, and the testator empowered the trustees at any time after his decease and whenever they should think necessary to sell and convert his estate into money. The testator died in 1842, leaving his daughter surviving, and she died in 1846, having had three children born in the testator's lifetime, one of whom had died in infancy, and two, Robert and Jane, survived her. Jane died a spinster intestate in 1882, and Robert then became solely entitled in remainder as the heir-at-law of the testator. Robert died a bachelor and intestate in 1902, and was of unsound mind. Sales had been made by the trustees, after the death of Jane, during the life of Robert, and the question was whether the power of sale had been validly exercised after Robert had become absolutely entitled to the estate. The question became important for the purpose of declaring whether the investments of the proceeds of such sales were real or personal estate of the deceased Robert, and this involved the question of the duration of the power. Eady, J., came to the conclusion that it was a question of intention, and that on the will it was manifest that the testator intended that the power should continue during the whole of the lifetime of his grandchild, Robert.

TRUST FOR PERSON "ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF RENTS AND PROFITS" OF SETTLED ESTATE—TENANT IN TAIL IN REMAINDER.

In re Fothergill, Price-Fothergill v. *Price* (1903) 1 Ch. 149. By a will certain specific chattels were bequeathed in trust for the person entitled to the actual possession or receipt of the rents and