

aggression for political subversion know now that this strength and this unity stand in the way; more and more solidly in the way. The moral of this, then, is not to abandon the course that is leading us to safety but to persist - steadily but unprovocatively - in this strengthening and in the consolidation of this unity. Those are the ends to which the North Atlantic Council is working and to which our next meeting at Lisbon in a few weeks time will make, I think, a greater contribution than that made by any that have preceded it.

But if there is cause for less anxiety in Europe, there is cause for more in Asia. In Korea the purposes and the designs of the Communist aggressor at the cease-fire table are difficult to establish. Never was there a more frustrating or tortuous negotiation, nor can we yet tell whether it will leave the United Nations position, or the United Nations forces, who have succeeded in blocking and defeating aggression there, stronger or weaker. This is a risk being taken for peace. It is worth taking. If it fails, the responsibility for such failure must be made clear. If it succeeds, and later there is bad faith and renewed aggression in Korea, the responsibility will be equally clear and the consequences may be far-reaching. That should be clearly understood by those who would break any armistice arranged.

The defence lines against Communist aggression, in Asia, however, are far more extensive than the width of the Korean peninsula. They cannot all be held in equal military strength with the resources presently available. That makes it the more important that Western participation in the defence of that part of the world against aggression should rest on a strong political foundation; that it should be allied with national and economic progress and not be saddled with the dragging weights of social injustice, racial discriminations, or political reaction. If Asia goes Communist, and this must be considered as at least a possibility, it will be for no love of Russia or of Marx, but because the agents of Russia and Marx were able to exploit and harness to revolution the longing for a piece of bread, a roof and the right to stand erect. It is only by their own exertions and their own policies that the peoples of Asia can secure these benefits. But we can help them, to some extent, materially, but also by our understanding of their aspirations and giving them the assurance of our desire to co-operate with them in the solution of their problems.

In Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, then, the situation is heavy with danger; all the more so because the danger may express itself, not in open aggression where we would know where we were, but in aid and assistance to those who are already fighting against local governments. There may be no clear-cut breach of the peace as there was in Korea and consequently no clear-cut basis for collective defence. Indo-China, Burma and Malaya have shown how desperately difficult such situations can become.

In Europe, however, as I have said, the situation seems somewhat brighter. But here also there is a new danger - new perhaps only in our increasing consciousness of it. It is a possible weakening of morale, following economic and political instability. The Cominform leaders in the Kremlin