

In our opinion, the January note from Peking - their reply - represents an advance both in form and substance over the previous statements given by Peking at or to the United Nations. Furthermore, certain obscure passages in that reply have now been given an interpretation by the Peking authorities which in my opinion, and notwithstanding its summary rejection by certain members of this Committee as unworthy of consideration, may represent a substantial additional advance.

Part 1 of the communication from Peking of January 17 lays down Peking's principles for a cease-fire and a settlement along the lines originally stated by that Government and by the Soviet bloc. I have already expressed my views on these principles. I think that they are quite unacceptable and form no basis for a just settlement.

Part 2 of the Chinese note makes certain observations on our statement of principles. These are of very considerable importance, if obscure in a few places. In the first place -- and they are not very obscure on this point -- they misrepresent completely the purpose of a cease-fire by saying it is designed merely to give United Nations troops a breathing space, ignoring entirely that sentence which reads:

"Such an arrangement ..." -- that is, a cease-fire -- "should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive."

They also ignore point 5 of the proposed cease-fire arrangements included in our report of January 2, which reads:

"All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and material."

More important, however -- indeed of critical importance -- are the comments of the Peking note of January 17 on the relations between a cease-fire and political negotiations. If the Peking telegram meant that there must be final agreement on all of the cease-fire arrangements, and that there must be political discussions before the shooting stops, that of course would be completely unacceptable as I see it. If, however, the note meant that there must first be negotiations to decide the time and basic conditions of the cease-fire, that, on the other hand, would be, to me at least, quite acceptable. Indeed, we tried last December in the Cease-Fire Group to have just such negotiations, and we were not very successful. This is a point on which the further interpretation given by the Chinese authorities in Peking seems to me to be of some importance, for, in spite of what the representative of the Philippines said yesterday, they appear to me now to be saying that they are prepared to enter into and conclude cease-fire arrangements before the discussion of any other subject is begun.