

establish a regime that would be able to verify agreed upon controls on the RMA. As the platforms and the C4I technologies upon which they rely are clearly within the realm of conventional weaponry, negotiating a treaty would be problematic. What would be outlawed and why? Precision-guided weapons and cruise missiles and the ability to target and control them are at the heart of the RMA weaponry. Control of computer-related technologies would require more extensive and continual intrusive on-site verification than contained in the NPT and biological weapons agreements. There is space-based surveillance technology for NTM available to support any treaty, but what would it be looking for and could it find it? In the meantime, those countries which have an edge in this area, such as the United States, are interested in using it to monitor the spread of WMDS and rogue state advances in RMA.

Yet while it may not be able to subject the RMA to an verifiable arms control regime, this does mean that governments and international organizations are at a complete disadvantage when it comes to monitoring the proliferation of RMA-related weapons. As noted above, much is known and in the public realm. The problems would come when efforts were made to use this information to establish a credible arms control regime, one that would actually limit the spread of RMA weapons technology. The shortcomings of the traditional systems, including satellite surveillance and the need for unprecedented, and likely unacceptable, levels of intrusion to make the regime credible, strongly limit prospects for such an agreement.

Any effort to control the RMA would also encounter a major international political hurdle one directly related to the RMA itself with its American dominance and American concerns. As noted above, the United States has much to lose if the technologies which it now counts upon spread undermining its ability to apply force quickly and with minimal cost. To this extent Washington has an interest in curtailing the proliferation of RMA technologies. Moreover, any credible arms control regime for the RMA will require the surveillance systems and intelligence gathering techniques of the United States.

However, an American-led and dominated effort to create an international regime designed to curtail the spread of the RMA would have many of the problems now associated with the NPT. It would in essence seek to deny to other countries the weapons systems which the United States and its allies believe they should maintain for the sake of their own interest. In addition, Washington is likely to be selective on the issue of proliferation. It will want its allies to have some of the RMA capabilities it now has in order to solidify security ties and enhance interoperability. In other words, an arms control regime which truly limits the spread of the RMA will work to the advantage of the United States.

## **RESPONSES TO THE RMA, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WMD AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION**

The difficulties of controlling the RMA might be acceptable if other dimensions of arms control were not adversely impacted. This brings up the second major consideration associated with