

whole spectrum of nuclear weapons development for all practical purposes would be covered. Certainly, as has been outlined, adequate verification measures would probably require some further refinement and testing, but that demands no other scientific and technical resources than those already within our reach."

The same view is held by former CIA Deputy Director H. Scoville, who recently noted that the national technical means available at present to all the countries together are sufficient to guarantee compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. He explicitly indicated that the United States officials who invoke the "difficulties" of verifying the compliance with such a treaty are using this argument to conceal their reluctance to stop the continuous development and creation of new types of nuclear weapons.

An immediate and unconditional cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is demanded by the socialist, the non-aligned and the neutral countries, as their representatives have stated, in particular, at the current session of the Conference on Disarmament.

We have also noted the statements made at the Conference by Foreign Ministers Hayden of Australia and Abe of Japan, which were largely devoted to the nuclear-weapon-test-ban problem. Many ideas expressed in those statements sound rather questionable to us. At the same time, however, we regard the very fact of those issues being raised at the Conference as showing the concern of Australia and Japan over the continuing lack of solution to the problem of nuclear-weapon tests. An important statement, in our view, was made by the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, who said that the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban continues to be a matter of "greatest importance" for his country, and that his Government favours the resumption of the trilateral talks and ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-United States treaties limiting the scale of underground nuclear explosions.

What, then, is the matter? Why cannot the Conference even initiate talks on the nuclear-test-ban issue? The main reason, it is said, is that the Conference members cannot in any way reach agreement on the mandate for the relevant subsidiary body. We believe that this view is not serious, to say the least. The basic reason is the negative attitude of the United States to banning nuclear tests, the fact that Washington places the improvement of its nuclear arsenals among the major goals of its military policy. Until the United States reconsiders its position on the nuclear-test ban and starts treating this task as an urgent priority, as the overwhelming majority of States does, there can obviously be no forward movement. As matters stand, attempts to set up a subsidiary body of the Conference with a curtailed mandate would be not merely pointless but actually harmful since they could be used as a cover for the implementation of various United States military programmes.

The work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts is also organically linked to the state of the nuclear-test-ban issue at the Conference. We have no objection to taking note at this point of the Ad Hoc Group's report submitted by its Chairman, Mr. Dahlman, and we hope that the international experiment scheduled for the end of this year will take place successfully. At the same time, I would like to state most firmly that further activity of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts could only serve a useful purpose if the United States did not prevent the Conference from conducting practical negotiations on a complete and general nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty.

As to the Soviet Union, its position concerning a nuclear-test ban is abundantly clear: we shall continue most resolutely and persistently to seek a complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The Conference has before it the Soviet draft "Basic Provisions for a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests", which incorporates all the many years of negotiating experience and takes account of the proposals and wishes of many States, including questions of verification. The Soviet Union is prepared to further consider in a constructive spirit the proposals of