

to encourage the Soviet Union to believe that it could get its way in the United Nations merely by the violent and menacing repetition of its demands. At the same time, the accusation repeatedly made by Mr. Vishinsky that Yugoslavia had been put forward as an Anglo-American candidate was effectively disproved when the United States and United Kingdom Governments announced their intention of following opposite policies in the election, the former supporting Yugoslavia and the latter Czechoslovakia.

The consequences which the Representative of the U.S.S.R. threatened to visit upon the United Nations if Yugoslavia was elected turned out in the end to be of little importance. Following the election Mr. Vishinsky stated that the U.S.S.R. would never regard the choice of Yugoslavia as a legal constitutional act. There was, however, no suggestion that the U.S.S.R. would withdraw from the United Nations or cease to sit on the Security Council because of the election of Yugoslavia. In the long run the effect of the change may be to lessen the tendency towards rigidity which has been developing in regard to Security Council elections.

Elections to the Security Council are conducted by secret ballot and it is the practice of many states, including Canada, to refrain from announcing their intentions before the vote or making public, after the elections, the way in which they have cast their vote. By this means, they are able to maintain the principle that, through the secret ballot, pressure upon smaller members of the United Nations in regard to the way they vote may be avoided. Some states, and in particular the Great Powers which assume responsibilities for major leadership in the United Nations, openly announce their votes and support the candidates of their choice. Provided the right of secrecy in balloting is maintained, there can be no objection to states declaring their vote if they wish to do so. In vigorously contested elections, however, it is important that the principle of secrecy should be maintained, through its strict observance by a considerable number of responsible members of the Assembly.

## International Control of Atomic Energy

Only three days after General Romulo had opened the Fourth Session of the General Assembly with the expression of his fervent hope that it might go down in history as the "Peace Assembly", President Truman announced that an atomic explosion had recently taken place in the Soviet Union. On the day of this announcement, Mr. Vishinsky made the first of a series of propaganda attacks on the Western countries, which did nothing to promote the atmosphere of compromise and conciliation for which the President of the Assembly had hoped, but intensified the acrimony of the "peace" debate, of which the international control of atomic energy was perhaps the focus, and of the atomic energy debate itself.

The deadlock acknowledged in May 1948, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (of which Canada is a permanent member), had not been accepted as final by the General Assembly meeting in Paris in 1948, which had requested the Commission to see what could be done, either in