

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

FRANCE.

THE CONGRESS.—The Pays announces in a semi-official form that the Congress, the meeting of which was provisionally fixed for Jan. 5, will positively assemble on the 20th. The Congress may now be said to be definitely constituted. The following is a complete (with the exception of Naples and Sweden) and accurate list of the Plenipotentiaries.—Rome, Cardinal Antonelli and Monsignore Sacconi; England, Lord Cowley and Lord Wodehouse; France, Count Walewski and Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne; Russia, Prince Gortschakoff and M. de Kisseleff; Prussia, Baron Scheinberg and Baron Pourtales; Austria, Count Reichenberg and Prince Metternich; Piedmont, Count Cavour and M. Desambrois; Spain, M. Martinez de la Rosa and Mon; Portugal, Viscount Paiva and Count Larradio. Prince Gortschakoff will arrive in Paris between the 6th and 19th of January. In the autograph letter of the Pope to the Emperor, His Holiness is said to have declared that he is willing to be represented at the Congress, having full confidence in the loyalty and firmness of the Eldest Son of the Church, to whom God has entrusted the mission to protect the patrimony of St. Peter against illegal covetousness. The Federal Council intends to ask at the Congress that the neutrality of Savoy may be guaranteed by the Italian Confederation, as it already is by Piedmont, in virtue of the treaties of 1815.

In reply to a memorandum addressed by Switzerland to the Powers composing the Congress, the majority have expressed themselves favorable to the admission of Plenipotentiaries of Switzerland at the time when the Congress deliberates on the neutrality of the Province of Savoy.

The Paris correspondent of the *Universel* says, that since the Congress has been decided on, the representatives of the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta have commenced to prepare a memorial similar to the one presented by them in 1818, at the Congress of Aix la Chapelle. This memorial is a kind of protestation against the possession of Malta by England. It may be remembered, that the treaty of Amiens stipulated the restoration of Malta by England, to the sovereignty of the Order.

THE POPE AND THE CONGRESS.—The pamphlet referred to in our last as lately published in Paris, and to have received the same inspiration as the celebrated pamphlet of "Napoleon III. et l'Italie" contains eleven sections:—

I. The first section declares the writer's belief in a medium between the opinions of those who detest the temporal power of the Pope, and those who, "looking upon that power as an article of faith, will not allow it to be touched." It says: "We sincerely believe that it is not impossible for the Sovereign Pontiff to retain his patrimony without imposing by force upon the population an authority which reigns in the name of God."

II. The second section declares "the temporal power of the Pope necessary for the exercise of his spiritual power."

"If the Pope were not an independent Sovereign he would be either French, Spanish, Austrian, or Italian, and the title of his nationality would deprive him of his character as universal Pontiff. The Holy See would be nothing more than the stay of a throne at Paris, Vienna, or Madrid."

"The spiritual power, the seat of which is at Rome, cannot be displaced without shaking the political power, not only in the Catholic States, but in all Christian States. It is equally important for England, Russia, and Prussia, as it is for France and Austria, that the august representative of Catholic unity should neither be constrained, nor humiliated, nor subordinate. Rome is the centre of a moral power too universal for it not to be in the interests of all Governments and all peoples that it should not incline to any side, and that it should remain immovable on the sacred rock which no human power can overthrow."

III. But what is the Pope's temporal power? "How can the Pope be at the same time Pontiff and King? How can the man of the Gospel who forgives be the man of the law who punishes? How can the Head of the Church who excommunicates heretics be the head of the State who protects freedom of conscience?"

"It is neither by monarchy nor by liberty that this end can be obtained. The power of the Pope can only be a paternal power; he must rather resemble a family than a State. Thus, not only is it not necessary that his territory should be of large extent, but we think that it is even essential that it should be limited. The smaller the territory, the greater the Sovereignty."

A great State implies requirements "which it is impossible for the Pope to satisfy." He cannot "participate in the general movement of ideas," take advantage of the transformations of the age, of the conquests of science, of the progress of the human mind. "The world will advance and leave him behind, and then one of two things will happen—either everything will be extinguished in that people, and nothing will remain in it of the generous activity of public life, or else the noble aspirations of nationality will burst through, and it will become necessary, as we have witnessed already, for material force to supply the deficiencies of moral authority."

This France cannot wish. IV. Thus "the temporal of the Pope" is necessary and legitimate; but it is incompatible with a State of any extent. It is only possible, if exempt from all the ordinary conditions of power—that is to say, from everything that constitutes its activity, its development, its progress. It must exist without an army, without a Parliament, so to say, without a code of laws or a court of justice.

Hence the Pope must have sufficient territory and subjects enough "not to be subjugated himself, and to be a sovereign of the temporal order," but so limited as not to oblige him to act a political part. "The existence may be admitted in Europe of a small corner of earth, free from the passions and interests which agitate other people, and de-

voted solely to the glory of God. In that corner of earth, illustrated by the grandest reminiscences of history, the centre of Catholic unity has replaced the capital of the world. Rome, which formerly resumed within her all the grandeur of the Pagan era, has an exceptional calling. In losing her political domination she has acquired a domination of a more elevated character in the spiritual order, and she styles herself 'the Eternal City!' Religion, sciences, and the arts, also form a nationality. Those who live at Rome, under the authority of the Head of the Church, are doubtless subject to particular conditions of social and civil life; but if they are no longer the members of a great country they are still the citizens of a glorious metropolis, which extends its influence wherever faith is maintained and spreads. Rome belongs, then, to the Head of the Church. Should she slip away from that august power, she would at once lose all her prestige; Rome with a tribune, orators, writers, a secular Government, and a Prince at the Vatican, would be nothing more than a town. Liberty would disinherit her.—After having given laws to the whole world, she can only retain her greatness by commanding souls. The Roman Senate has no other compensation worthy of it but the Vatican."

V. There is then, "nothing more simple, more legitimate, and more essential than the Pope throning at Rome and possessing a limited territory. To satisfy so high an interest it is fully permitted to withdraw some hundred thousand souls from the life of nations, without, however, sacrificing them, and giving them guarantees of welfare and social protection."

The Pope's army should be reduced so as to be nothing more than an emblem of public order. As he is the Spiritual Sovereign of all his flock, "it is for the Catholic Powers to provide the means which concern them all by a large tribute paid to the Holy Father, so as to make his budget international like his authority." Thus there will be a people in Europe who will be ruled less by a King than by a father; a people who will have no national representation, no army, no press, no magistracy.

"The whole of its political existence will be limited to its municipal organisation. Beyond that narrow circle it will have no other resource than contemplation, the arts, the study of ruins (*la culture des ruines*), and prayer. He will be for ever disinherited of that noble portion of activity which in every country is the stimulus of patriotism and the legitimate exercise of the faculties of the mind of superior characters.—Under the Government of the Sovereign Pontiff, there can be no aspiration either to the glory of the soldier or the triumphs of the orator or of the statesman. It will be the Government of peace and reflection—a sort of oasis where the passions and interests of politics will not trespass, and which will only have the sweet and calm contemplation of a spiritual world."

"This 'exceptional condition' will doubtless be 'painful for men who feel within the noble ambitions to serve and raise themselves by merit, and who are condemned to inaction.' But they will be compensated by 'a paternal Government' by 'the exemption from taxation,' by 'the moral greatness of their country,' by 'the brilliancy' of a court maintained by liberal tributes paid by Catholic Powers, and by 'the chance of having great Popes such as history records.'"

VI. For all this, it is necessary to "restrict," instead of "extending," the Pope's territory.—And now another question presents itself—"a delicate question."

"The Romagna has been separated *de facto* for some months from the authority of the Popes. It has been living under a Provisional Government. It is actively ruled by a Government whose powers extend over all the States of Central Italy. Thus this separation bears for it all the marks of a *fait accompli*."

"Is the Romagna to be restored to the Pope? "Is it advisable, yea or no, for the glory of the Church, for the authority of its Head, that the Romagna should be restored to the patrimony of the Holy Father? This is all that we have to examine."

VII. The Romagna, despite the cession made of it by the Holy See in 1796, is a perfectly legitimate possession of the Pontifical Government. The revolt is, therefore, against right and the treaties of 1815. But are the Papacy and religion interested in the claim of the Pontifical Government to the Romagna under these treaties?

"We ourselves are of opinion that the separation of the Romagna would not tend to diminish the temporal Power of the Pope. His territory it is true, would be diminished, but his political authority, disencumbered of a resistance which paralyses it, would not be weakened, but morally strengthened."

VIII. Suppose that it is agreed to restore the Romagna to the Pope, how is it to be done?—There is only one means—force.

"An armed intervention to subjugate the Italians would be the most fatal step for the late Government, especially for the Pontifical Government."

Rome must remain under the Pope. "It is the decree of civilisation, of history, and of God Himself. But is that which is necessary for Rome also possible for the other cities of the Roman States?"

But if force was to be employed, would it be by France or by Austria? France "cannot do it. A Catholic nation, she would never consent to strike so serious a blow at the moral power of Catholicism. A liberal nation, she could not compel a people to submit to a Government which they will reject."

She has interfered to liberate nations, and "it is not the Emperor who could prove unfaithful to these generous traditions."

need of all its forces to meet dangers at home, and by forking a struggle it would incur the risk of a revolution. It would be the greatest act of imprudence it would commit to the prejudice of order, and especially to the prejudice of the Holy See. Opposed to the King of Naples, the champion of absolutism, would stand the King of Piedmont, the supporter of the liberty of peoples. Civil war would have to decide, and anarchy would fatally be the last word of so disastrous an attempt.

The armed intervention of Naples is not possible, for it would be a manifest violation of the neutrality imposed upon all the Italian States. In fact, if the Nonpolitian army entered the States of the Church, nothing could prevent the Piedmontese army from occupying Parma and Tuscany.

A European Congress alone can intervene. To alter the frontiers of the independent States of Italy "requires a reference to the same jurisdiction that regulated them—that is to say, to all the Powers who were parties to the treaties of 1815. In 1815 the Powers disposed of the people of Romagna; in 1860, if they are not placed under the authority of the Pope, the Powers of Europe can only formally record a *fait accompli*."

Europe, which in 1815, could sacrifice Italy, can in 1860, emancipate and save her. The right of acting is the same; the only question is its better application.

"We believe there is another course that may be taken. First, we wish that the Congress should recognise as an essential principle of European order, the necessity of the temporal power of the Pope. That is for us the chief point. The principle here appears to us to have more value than the territorial possession, more or less extensive, that will be its natural consequence. As for this territory itself, the city of Rome includes all that is most important in it, the rest is only secondary. The city of Rome and the Patrimony of St. Peter must be guaranteed to the Sovereign Pontiff by the great Powers, with a considerable revenue, that the Catholic States will pay, as a tribute of respect and protection to the Head of the Church. An Italian Militia, chosen from the elite of the Federal army, should assure the tranquillity and inviolability of the Holy See. Municipal liberties, as extensive as possible, should release the Papal Government from all the details of administration, and thus give a share of public local life to those who are disinherited of political activity. Finally, every complication, every idea of war and of revolt, must be for ever banished from the territory governed by the Pope, that it may be said, where reigns the Vicar of Christ, there also reigns, well-being, concord, and peace."

After assuming that the question is not that of diminishing the Patrimony of St. Peter but of saving it, and referring to the restoration of religion in France by the first Napoleon, the pamphlet thus concludes:—"May his heir have the honor in his turn to reconcile the Pope, as temporal Sovereign, with his subjects and his age! This is what all hearts sincerely Catholic ought to ask of Heaven."

"The *Constitutionnel* publishes an article, signed by its principal editor, M. Grandguillot, approving in general the contents of the pamphlet. 'Le *Pape et le Congrès*,' declaring, however, a resolve to combat some of the propositions made by the author.

The following is from the *Times* Paris correspondent. Certain circumstances which it is unnecessary to allude to more particularly, and which have no public interest, afforded me the opportunity of becoming acquainted with a curious conversation which took place a few days since between two persons—one a Frenchman the other an Englishman—on the important and absorbing topic of the day. Having a pretty good memory, I have retained the various points urged by the parties in the dialogue. I am desirous of directing your attention to the remarks of the French interlocutor in particular, as I have reason to believe that what he says faithfully renders the opinions expressed in high quarters. I prefer giving the conversation in the form in which it occurred, so as not to omit a single expression. After a few unimportant remarks on ordinary subjects, the Englishman, with characteristic frankness continued thus:—

"You know my sentiments with regard to France, and my sincere desire to see the most complete union always subsist between my country and yours. Judge, then of my surprise, and (allow me to add) my sorrow, at finding that the relations between our respective countries have gradually and profoundly—at least if we may judge by appearances. I have carefully and conscientiously examined the state of the public mind in England. I have interrogated and listened to persons of every class from the highest to the very lowest. Well, then, I declare to you, to my deep regret, I have found, with the one as with the other, mistrust pushed to the point of only believing in menaces on the part of your country, and fear to that of deeming it necessary to put themselves in a state of defence. I address myself to you, to explain certain facts which are generally represented in England as flagrant proofs of the bad intentions of France with respect to us."

Frenchman.—"What you, my dear Sir! You whose mind is so just and upright; you, whose judgment is sound, and whose reason so firm and enlightened—you, too, caught the contagion? In truth, you would make me laugh if I did not know you to be serious, and I would class you among the foolish if I did not know you to be the contrary. Yes, I declare to you in the eyes of my countrymen, as in my own, the panic spread abroad in England is actually folly."

Englishman.—"Folly, as much as you please.—The fact does not the less exist; and, as it exists, it must be taken into serious consideration. Do you not foresee a fatal result, if so many unfounded rumors are credited? People's minds on both sides will grow embittered; and the merest cause will suffice to bring about a rupture, and the slightest spark to light up a flame."

Frenchman.—"The difficulty is to lead back to the truth those who obstinately wander from it, and to cure the blind who will not see. Nevertheless, I wish to submit to your diseased imagination facts that cannot be refuted—to those phantoms that flit about on the other side of the Channel realities which cannot be easily verified and proved beyond dispute. Facts shall speak first, and figures after.—Now, the Emperor has given to no foreign Power more than to England guarantees of his desire to live in good harmony. Hardly had he ascended to power when he despatched, in spite of the Assembly, the French fleet to make common cause with yours in the East. Subsequently he united himself with you in the Crimean war; and when the insurrection which broke out in India employed all your army in Asia, did he profit by the absence of your force to pick a quarrel with you? On the contrary, he offered to the English troops a passage through France. He subscribed, as well as the *Impe Imp* Guard, for your wounded, while (he it said *en passant* and without meaning reproach) our wounded in Italy seemed to find you indifferent. Finally, how many measures for the last ten years have been proposed by divers Governments which might have shocked England? He has rejected them all, and made no merit whatever in your eyes of the rejection. How can so many proofs of cordiality so constant be all at once forgotten? And how does it come to pass that mistrust and error are substituted for the legitimate effect which it should have produced? Why should a line of conduct so honest be answered by passionate and mistaken alarm? I look about in vain, and I cannot understand the cause of this sudden terror in England. And, good heavens! what a time has been selected to propagate it! Why the very moment when the Emperor has given a rare example of moderation. From the very day when he proposed and concluded peace people were pleased to attribute

to him ambitious designs; he was represented as marching to new conquests, when, in reality, the impetuosity of his troops, he so resolutely traced the limit beyond which he would not push his victory.—There is, then, something insensate in converting into one eager for war the man than whom none can wish to be more pacific; and, into a cause of fear what ought to be a pledge of security."

Englishman.—"The conduct of the Emperor would, I admit, be the most appropriate argument to convince us, and his sympathy for England has never ceased to inspire us with confidence. But, the people—but the army! Come now, frankly speaking, do not they both detest us? And will not public opinion force our Sovereign some day to declare war against us?"

Frenchman.—"To such questions as these I reply—Error, error the most grave, my dear Sir. It cannot be denied that there is at bottom, in both countries, a remnant of rancor and rivalry which still subsists, but subsists much more in a latent than in an aggressive state. Material interests on one side, liberal ideas on the other, tend incessantly to draw the two countries closer to each other. Moreover, France is more practical than you imagine. What advantage, material or moral, could a war with you bring us? None—absolutely none. Consequently no one desires it. But have you expressed all your thoughts? Do you not keep silent as to the cause of this mistrust which is so universal in England against the Emperor and his Government? Be candid, and I shall be the same."

Englishman.—"Well, then, I shall be candid.—Here is our decisive reason, our principal grievance; the development given to the French navy is out of all proportion with the requirements and the greatness of your country."

Frenchman.—"This is another prejudice; it is possible that a man like you should share it? Truly if instead of being some hours distant from our frontier, England was at the Antipodes, one would not find it a greater stranger than you appear to be to what is passing in France. You speak of our extraordinary armaments, but are you quite sure of the fact? Some journals have printed it; you have read it. Some persons have told you of it; you have repeated it, and you believe it—that's all.—Such is the only source of your conviction. Learn then what is doing in France, and hold it for certain. Not a centime can be spent without the vote of the Legislative Corps, and without the previous examination of the Council of State. Consult the estimates of the navy and army, and you shall find in them no excessive expenditure on the part of the Government."

Englishman.—"Your estimates are nothing to me, my dear Sir; I am ignorant as to how they are arranged. Figures are easy of handling, and are susceptible of every combination. Facts, on the contrary, are inflexible; and since you have appealed to them I will appeal to them in turn. At Toulon and Brest you are building plated ships. Against whom can they be intended, if not against us? At Nantes you have on the stocks hundreds of flat bottomed boats. For what purpose, if it be not to throw in an instant 20,000 soldiers on our coast? And then, your immense supplies of fuel, and the prodigious quantity of your arsenals? Everywhere you are building ships; everywhere you are casting rifled cannon, and projectiles of all kinds. There are so many evident facts, and of public notoriety. What answer will you give me to them?"

Frenchman.—"The most categorical in the world Give me your attention, for I will now quote laws and regulations, authentic reports, and go back to a period which will not be suspected by you.—According to a Royal ordinance of the 22d November, 1846, the total strength of the naval forces on the peace footing was to be 328 ships, of which 40 liners and 50 frigates—sailing vessels. When the war in the Crimea came on France had very few steamships; it was easy to see that sailing ships had passed their time, and that it was necessary to boldly admit the principle that henceforth every man-of-war must be a steamer. The Emperor consequently named in 1855, under the presidency of Admiral Hamelin, a commission to fix the basis of the new fleet necessary for France. The commission reported in favour of transforming the sailing ships, and of appropriating to them our ports, giving them especially the yards and docks which they required. The report terminated by demanding that the annual grant for the maintenance of the materials of the fleet should be augmented by an annual sum of 25,000,000f. for 13 years, the period judged indispensable to complete their transformation. Of that sum 5,000,000f. were applied to the ports. The Council of State, when called upon to give its opinion, reduced to 17,000,000f. for 13 years the amount of extraordinary credits demanded for the navy. Do not tire, my dear Sir, with these details. Here is one quite recent, and not less precise:—In 1859 our fleet consisted of 37 ships of the line (*aussaux*) and 15 frigates, screw, completed; and of three plated frigates. We have then, in order to arrive at the force on a peace footing, decided under Louis Philippe, 13 ships of the line to transform, and 35 frigates to build, which I repeat, will still require 10 years at least. As for the plated frigates—the invention of the Emperor—nothing more natural than to construct them as an experiment, since if they succeed they can be advantageously substituted for ships of the line. But this is not all; the necessity of having only a steam fleet entailed on us expenses from which England may be exempted. When our fleet used sails, and we had an expedition to send, as for instance to Africa, to the Crimea, and to Italy, it was easy to find among the trade sailing transports for men, horses, or stores. But at the present day our merchant navy is not sufficiently developed to enable us to find steam transports when we have need of them.—We are therefore forced to build them, in order to have at all times a certain number ready, and this imperative obligation is so present to us, that at the very moment I am speaking to you all our transports are proceeding to China; and, that we may not be entirely without resources, and be unprovided, the Naval Department has been obliged to purchase three large steamships in England. You see, then, I have at heart to convince you that I penetrate without hesitation to the very bottom of things, and I disclose to you the minutest details of our situation."

Englishman.—"These categorical explanations begin to reassure me. But have you any such to give me on the supplies of coals and the boats intended for the landing of troops?"

Frenchman.—"I will continue with the same frankness. Some months back your Tory Ministry was so much opposed to the war in Italy that every thing announced its wish to place itself on the side of Austria. It was even on the point of causing coal to be considered as contraband of war. Now our navy used only English coal. The Minister had then to occupy himself with that semi-hostile attitude of your Ministry, and to look about for the means of supplying, in case of need, the French fleet with French coal. It was his duty not to leave our supplies at the mercy of your Government.—With this object, essays were made in changing our boilers, and coal was brought to Nantes, which was to be directed to Brest by the internal canals. Sixty iron barks, of a very small draught of water, were built to facilitate the transport of coals over the docks; but these boats, very different from those which serve for the landing of troops, did not merit the honour of exciting your apprehensions and disturbing your sleep."

Englishman.—"Very good. Yet, for all that, you did not the less order from us a very considerable quantity of coal."

France 51 ships, carrying 26,000 tons of coal, to Martinique, to French Guiana, to Senegal, to Goree, to the island Reunion, to Mayotte, to Hongkong, to Shanghai, to Saigon, to the Mauritius, to Singapore. We have chartered in England 25 ships, carrying 31,000 tons of coal, to Hongkong, Woosung, Singapore, Echuang, St. Paul de Loanda, the Cape of Good Hope. Of all these details there is not one of which you may not procure the material proof, and then you must agree with me that the apprehensions of your countrymen are chimerical, and without reasonable foundation."

Englishman.—"I am willing to admit that what you tell me has the appearance of truth. I have a last objection, and it concerns your arsenals. If, as you assure me, your Government does not contemplate recommencing the war, why does it continue to show such great activity?"

Frenchman.—"I have in vain insisted on one essential point—viz., that, like other countries, we are in a complete state of transformation, but you seem not to wish to comprehend it. We have to change not only all the material of the navy, but on land also the whole of our artillery. And although the Emperor had in Italy 200 rifled cannon, he will still require three or four years to entirely accomplish the definitive transformation."

Englishman.—"I thank you for all this information; and I shall turn it to account."

Frenchman.—"Permit me one more observation.—You have avowed frankly all the apprehensions which my country causes you; but I have not expressed to you the whole of my opinion on yours.—If, in England, people are convinced that France desires to declare war against you, we here are, in our turn, well convinced that the mistrust excited on the other side of the Channel is a party manoeuvre. The Tory party, dissolved, as you are aware, by Sir Robert Peel, seeks the means of reconstructing itself; and, according to it, the best possible one would be by reviving the hatred of France, and by seeking, as in 1804, to form a European coalition against her. The statesmen who at this day take the lead in public opinion cannot be ignorant of all that I have just told you. Among us it is well understood that the Tories, in place of combating these errors, labor to gain them credit, and that they pursue their policy with traditional perseverance. People ought to take care however, lest by dint of wishing to deceive others they end by deceiving themselves.—There was a certain Marseillais, whose history occurs to me quite opportunely, and with which I may close a conversation which is already too long. Our Marseillais, wishing to have a joke at the expense of his fellow-citizens, went about crying out that a whale had just entered the port of Marseilles. His pleasantry succeeded, and every one ran to the port.—Soon, drawn on by the example, he himself began to run in the same direction to see, with others, if his invention was not a reality."

At this point the conversation ended. I also concluded, leaving you to judge of the arguments of the interlocutors, without other observations than repeating the assurance given you in the commencement.

ITALY.

THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY.—Sir H. W. Barron has addressed a letter to us, from which we (*Weekly Register*) make the following extracts:—

Sir—There is a view of the Italian revolution that has not been sufficiently dwelt on by either the Liberal or Conservative party in Great Britain. Yet, it is one affecting our character, our political consistency, our political position, and I may say, our stability as a great nation. The point of view that I wish to draw attention to is the very decidedly dangerous example this revolution holds out to the malcontents, the lovers of change, the discontented portion of society, in all the states of Europe. It is an undoubted fact that all those parties unite in admiration of this Italian revolution. It is an undoubted fact that this revolution has been mainly fomented by the King of Sardinia, aided by Mazzini, and the red-republican party. It is not assuming too much to say that Victor Emmanuel is a very ambitious man—that he sores no means to corrupt the press, to foster discontent in all his neighboring states, and to corrupt the army of Tuscany. These were his first steps in revolution. It is notorious that his minister at Florence hatched the revolution there, corrupted the generals and officers of the Tuscan army, bribed the press, and made his house the rendezvous of the discontented, the idle, and revolutionary party previous to April last, when the army turned traitors to their lawful sovereign. All this was done previous to any outbreak in Italy, previous to the French invasion, and at a time when Sardinia was at peace with Tuscany. Concurrent with these disgraceful acts, the King of Sardinia had secret emissaries at work in all the towns of northern Italy, exciting discontent, disseminating seditious writings, and privately seducing the inhabitants to enlist themselves in the Foreign Legion then raising in Sardinia, which was afterwards headed by Garibaldi. To aid his revolutionary projects, Victor Emmanuel gave his young and beautiful daughter in marriage to the Prince Napoleon, a man double her age, and a man whose antecedents were such, that no woman of sense and experience would espouse him. Are the people of those realms so degraded in character as to sanction such acts? Can good government proceed from the authors of such disgraceful conduct? But when to this is added the notorious fact that the King of Sardinia is a man of the vilest private profligacy, the most abandoned sensualist, totally devoid of even the semblance of religion or morality, what can we expect from his rule? His dominions are the most highly taxed in Italy. The funds of Sardinia are lower than any State in Italy. But, notwithstanding all these notorious facts, I am told "the Italians prefer him to any other Sovereign, and they are the best judges." I deny that fact; that the Italians prefer Victor Emmanuel. I believe from personal observation, inquiry on the spot, and the most undoubted evidence of trust-worthy individuals, that nine-tenths of the nobility, the landed gentry, a large majority of the educated classes, and the people are opposed to the present revolution. It is supported by some journalists, a large number of political adventurers, some busy, noisy, mob orators, a few ambitious men, all the usual idlers and *sans culottes* to be found in all large towns, aided by the military, whose leaders were bribed by the King of Sardinia and his Minister, Count Cavour. This revolutionary party gained courage and power by the presence of 150,000 Frenchmen in arms, and 40,000 Sardinians, all of whom aided, abetted, and excited the revolution, and on the other hand overawed the moderate, the loyal, and the peaceable, industrious portion of the Italian community. By these means the revolutionists got possession of the government, of the army, of the police, of the finances, and power of the State.

England is at this moment favouring all these revolutions under the hollow pretence of favouring liberty, and assisting the Italian people. By this policy England has weakened, if not forfeited, the friendship of France, and is laying the foundation of a rupture with that country. By this policy Austria is made a secret enemy of her affections alienated, and she is thrown into the arms of France, whilst at the same time we make no friends, no allies of any of the other great States of Europe. We cannot hope to conciliate Russia or Prussia, united as they are, against all revolutions, and favourable as they must be to legitimacy all over the world. Spain is in the same category, and the minor States of Europe dread nothing so much as revolutions and a repetition of the sad wars that devastated Europe after the first French revolution. England is, therefore, isolated by her present policy, and left without a friend, an ally, to support her in the day of need. There is a dark cloud in the horizon, and no harbour of refuge to shelter us—no friendly hand to aid in the coming struggle. This revolution is in fact a sequence, a branch of the French revolutions that have unsettled Europe for so many years—cost so much blood and treasure to every country in Europe