

he gave was a summary of Dieppe. I should like to continue that summary by quoting a few short extracts.

At the bottom of page 135 we find this:

By half-past six in the morning the force commanders on H.M.S. *Calpe* were well aware that the situation was not developing as well as had been hoped. No word had come from the Royal Regiment at Puits or from No. 3 Commando at Berneval. On the other hand, the situation at Pourville, where the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada were engaged, appeared not unfavourable. It was known, too, that No. 4 Commando had landed successfully at Vasterival. The military force commander decided that the time had come to make use of his reserves. They consisted, in the first place, of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, a famous French-Canadian regiment.

Then, at the middle of page 137 will be found these words:

Despite the efforts of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the eastern headland still remained untaken, and soon after seven o'clock, Major-General Roberts decided to reinforce again, this time with the Royal Marine Commando.

And a little further down are these words:

Like everyone else on board the ships, he could see but little, Dieppe was shrouded in smoke behind which the battle spluttered and rumbled. It seemed to the military force commander that, now the Casino was captured and the tanks were over the esplanade, there was still a good chance that he might seize the town. At that time, he did not know that the Essex Scottish and the Fusiliers Mont-Royal had been unable to subdue the eastern headland, but he knew that it was being attacked. There was a reasonable prospect, or so it appeared, that the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, if reinforced, would be able to capture the western headland. The Royal Marine Commando was accordingly sent in to help them to do so.

In the third paragraph on page 139 we find these words:

Not all the landing craft had reached the shore. Many were still coming in with great resolution under this heavy fire. On board one of them was the officer commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Phillips. In the sunlight striking the beaches and houses of Dieppe with all the greater brilliance after the darkness of the smoke through which he had just passed, he saw the true gravity of the situation. Far from being clear of the enemy, the beach was swept by their concentrated fire. Realizing that the situation was not what the military force commander had visualized, he determined to halt the landing if he could. By then his craft was close in shore. Putting on a pair of white gloves so that his hands could be the more easily seen, he jumped on to the forward deck and signalled to the remaining craft to put about and return to the smoke screen. They saw his hands moving and understood his meaning. As they began to turn, he fell mortally wounded. By his action, he had saved some

two hundred of his men from entering a fire which must have proved mortal to very many of them.

By now it was obvious that the headlands to the east and west of Dieppe would not be captured in time to permit an entry into the town; the doors were, in fact, still closed. It was decided to withdraw those who had been assaulting them and the town so intrepidly.

I should like to quote a few words from a review of this book by Blair Fraser, which appeared in the *Montreal Gazette* of Saturday, May 22. It was after I had read this review that I made the remarks which I did a couple of days ago. The relevant part reads as follows:

Gillis Purcell of the Canadian Press has already reviewed it in exhaustive detail in these columns. Little need be added except to say that Saunders makes it clear the Dieppe raid was a failure. Of ten objectives, one was fully and one partially achieved. However, a number of misconceptions about Dieppe are cleared up.

On page 3009 of *Hansard* the Minister of National Defence is reported as follows:

It was not General Roberts about whom my hon. friend was talking; it was the high command, and the high command were those of whom I was speaking, the officers I have mentioned.

The officers to whom I referred a moment ago. The Minister of National Defence is drawing an inference which is improper. I should like to interpret my own remarks. In addition to the reports one saw in the press and heard elsewhere is the fact that a general commanding a division, after having received battle experience which should have been invaluable to him in a similar capacity when invasion will take place later on, was removed from an active command and given a position as head of reinforcements, a departmental position. I think anyone would consider that a demotion. However, the minister does not refer to it as such. What I have referred to caused me to speak of the incompetent leadership by the high command, and by that I meant the high command who was in charge of this operation, the gentleman to whom I have just referred.

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend when making charges with regard to incompetent leadership and tragic failures should be more specific than he was the other evening if he wants it to mean anything other than what anyone would take normally, that the high command as we know it means those who are in charge of the strategic war. My hon. friend now says that it was General Roberts whom