

the same kind of thing when we come to deal with a minister of the crown; of whom more anon.

I would point out to the hon. member for Weyburn that we are no longer living in a day when we can discuss this matter in an academic sense. We are confronted with a condition in which our external trade, thanks to hon. gentlemen opposite, has been menaced and destroyed by the invasion and penetration of our market by our great neighbours to the south, who have taken it from us to the extent of nearly one billion dollars a year, and thus compelled Canadians to seek abroad in external fields a market for their products. Those markets can be made possible only by tremendous effort, in which the nation itself has assisted. We have assisted by subsidizing steamship lines, by subsidizing lines of communication other than steamship routes, by reducing the postal rates, by sending our trade commissioners to every part of the world to develop and expand our trade. All these things we have done. Why? Because we have been compelled to do it through the neglect of our own government to care for our own trade. That is the reason. If a storekeeper in a village permits trade to go to a rival from outside the community, and has to go to other communities far removed to find a market, I wonder if there is any man who would not say that that storekeeper had neglected his own home market, his own community. It is the internal trade of the country which has made the United States what it is. By securing a monopoly of its own domestic business, and exporting the surplus of the mass production of its mills and factories, it has been able to destroy the export trade that other countries enjoyed before the war. These are post war conditions. Once more I say Canada is dealing with actualities.

Let me point out that the other method by which we expand trade is by negotiating trade treaties. Perhaps the most classic example of a trade treaty—I thought of it this afternoon as the Minister of Finance was speaking—is the trade treaty negotiated between France and Great Britain in the days of Cobden. You will all recall his attachment to free trade, and the conditions that existed in France with its highly protective tariff in the days of the Second Empire. You will all recall that Mr. Cobden, in consequence of a chance conversation that he had with a well known free trade economist of France, Mr. Chevalier, made up his mind to see if a trade treaty could not be made between France and Great Britain, because France at

that time was a highly protectionist country while Britain under Peel had become more or less attached to free trade. I have here the life of Cobden by John Morley, and I read these words at page 239 of the second volume:

In the early part of September, Cobden paid a visit to Hawarden, and there he opened his mind to Mr. Gladstone. They were both of them thoroughly alive to the objections to which on strictly economic grounds treaties of commerce must always be open.

Now, I should like that sentence to be engraven on the memories of some of my friends opposite:

They were both of them thoroughly alive to the objections to which on strictly economic grounds treaties of commerce must always be open.

I heard some of them from my friends this afternoon, some of the grounds that were in the minds of Cobden and Gladstone at that time. Now, let me proceed with this quotation:

They both felt it to be perfectly true, if economic rules were never under any circumstances to be contravened, that, as Mr. Bright had already said, it was our business to look to our own tariffs, and to release French products from the duties that prevented our trading with France; and this without any stipulation as to what France should do in return. But then they felt that the occasion was one which could not be judged in this simple way. An economic principle by itself, as all sensible men have now learnt, can never be decisive of anything in the mixed and complex sphere of practice.

Now, sir, could any words more aptly describe the situation which in 1930 prevailed between Australia and Canada and that which prevailed between France and England in 1859?

But then they felt that the occasion was one which could not be judged in this simple way. An economic principle by itself, as all sensible men have now learnt, can never be decisive of anything in the mixed and complex sphere of practice. Neither Cobden nor Mr. Gladstone could resist the force of M. Chevalier's emphatic assurance, that in no other way could the French tariff be altered in the direction of free trade than through a diplomatic act, that is to say, a commercial treaty with England. The emperor, moreover, in spite of his absolutist system, was practically powerless to reduce his duties, unless the English government gave him the help of a corresponding movement on their side.

Mr. Gladstone discerned both the opportunity which such a movement would afford for continuing the great work of tariff reform, and the strong influence that a commercial treaty would have upon the violent and dangerous perturbations in the political sentiment of the two nations towards one another.

After a few more lines, he proceeds:

He was, in fact, continuing the work which Sir Robert Peel had begun in 1842, along the