

There is no doubt that the rejection of EDC has been a setback in this task, but that does not justify defeatism, despair or recrimination; the very things that the Communist forces, who are so bitterly opposed to European unity and North Atlantic integration, gleefully hope will happen as a result of the Paris decision.

The Premier of France, the Government of which has rejected EDC, has, himself, already reaffirmed the goal which is the one we must reach.

We should remember his words, uttered after the failure of the Brussels Conference:

"The French Government", he said then, "intends that Germany should be fully associated in another part of the same statement he used the word 'integrated' with the Western Community. It excludes any neutralization of Germany and is opposed to any settlement which would leave it isolated in the heart of Europe."

Those are wise words, and represent, I think, the policy of all the governments, and the opinion of the great majority of the people of the North Atlantic countries, excluding, of course, the Communists. It is also recognized in Germany itself as the policy which best corresponds with their interests, though its rejection or delay might release and strengthen forces in Germany which would work towards other more dubious ends with unhappy results.

I realize, of course, that there are difficulties, and even dangers, in working out this policy. These require that we should proceed carefully. They may well preclude an automatic and simple solution, such as immediate and full membership, say, in NATO without previous arrangements agreed between Germany and the NATO members, particularly with the three countries, the United Kingdom, United States and France, who have special responsibilities in Germany under the Occupation Statute.

It is also necessary, and this is especially true of those members of NATO across the water from Europe, always to keep in mind the fears, the feelings and, indeed, the memories of Frenchmen, and other continental neighbours of Germany who twice in this century have been the victims of military aggression and have borne the burden and the humiliation of military occupation. With our eyes to a better future, we must not allow the tragedies and miseries of historical experience to determine policy. But it is hard to prevent such experience from influencing attitudes.

We should, furthermore, not ignore the possible effects of German integration into the Western system on the policy of the Soviet Empire, which now includes, we should not forget, not only a substantial part of Germany this side of the Oder-Neisse line, but also Russian and Polish territories east of that line which were German before 1939.

While German integral association with the West must not, of course, be considered as freezing the present division of Germany (the Germans cannot be expected to accept that), on the other hand, it does not commit the