

the General Assembly, however, the United Nations had, by the end of September, succeeded in authorizing the establishment of a United Nations Force for the Congo of almost 20,000 men, supplied largely by African states; the creation of a voluntary fund with a goal of \$100 million to provide emergency support for the civil administration of the Congo; and the provision of a generous measure of technical assistance by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.

Throughout the crisis in the Congo the Canadian attitude continued to be one of firm support for the United Nations and for the Secretary-General, who, as the operations developed, came under severe criticism from a number of quarters, but particularly from the Soviet Union. In addition to this political support, the Canadian Government's contribution to the United Nations operations had, by the end of 1960, involved supplying a group of highly qualified technical personnel from the Canadian Armed Services to the United Nations Force, particularly for communications purposes; pledging \$1 million to the special fund for the Congo, subject to Parliamentary approval; and indicating willingness to absorb Canada's share of the costs of the initial airlift for the UN Force, amounting to some \$600,000. With a view to giving further assistance to the United Nations in meeting the serious financial crisis brought on by its responsibilities in the Congo, the Canadian Government also indicated its readiness to make an advance payment of \$1.5 million against its assessment for membership in the organization in 1961.

Demand for Reorganized Secretariat

Against this background, the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, while one of the most dramatic since the United Nations was founded, was one of the most discouraging and unproductive. From the outset its proceedings were complicated by the need for elaborate security precautions because of the presence of so many heads of government and by the necessity of dealing, frequently in disorderly plenary sessions, with items of business that might have been better disposed of in committee or behind the scenes in the normal way. Furthermore, Soviet frustration over the turn of events in the Congo was instrumental in producing a series of angry attacks by Mr. Khrushchov on the Secretary-General and on the structure of the Secretariat. The Soviet Union expressed a desire to replace the Secretary-General by a committee of three, and it became clear that this idea—which, if put into practice, would result in paralyzing the United Nations—was to be extended to the Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies as well.

Mr. Khrushchov's demands were evidently considered unacceptable by the great majority of members. His arguments were rebutted by the Prime Minister of Canada among others in an important address to the General Assembly on September 26. Nevertheless, there were indications that the Soviet Union intended to persist in its campaign to make sure not only that the capacity of the United Nations for any further effective action in the Congo would be destroyed but, apparently, that the United Nations would from the outset be unable to act effectively to meet any future crisis.

In this atmosphere of deep division and frustration, the Assembly found itself unable to complete its business in the normal way and adjourned on December 20 after a decision to resume work on March 7, 1961. Although it had been expanded towards the close of 1960 by the