

ONUMOZ collected from the military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, a total of 189,827 weapons.⁸² The numbers were well below expectations and generally of poor quality.⁸³ After complaints and indications of secret weapons caches, the Cease-fire Commission secured an agreement to introduce a post-demobilization "verification process" which led to the discovery of "substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or stored throughout the country."⁸⁴ However, by the UN's own admission, the time was then too short before the end of the mandate to complete the task.⁸⁵

A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the new Mozambican Defence Force.⁸⁶ The mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction⁸⁷ and no donor could be found to fund the programme.⁸⁸

After severe delays in the implementation of the demining programme⁸⁹, in May 1994 the UNOHAC Deputy Director took charge of the coordination and management of an accelerated programme and the Mine Clearance Training Centre began operations. By the end of the mandate, ONUMOZ had trained 450 Mozambicans for 10 de-mining teams and they had cleared some 40,000 square metres and disabled over 555 mines.⁹⁰ In addition, of the approximately 1,579,555 refugees repatriated, all had been made aware of the existence of landmines and most had received information on how to live with the menace. At the termination of ONUMOZ, the government of Mozambique had not yet

⁸² UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, Part II C., paragraph 11b of the "Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", dated 22 December 1994.

⁸³ See the "Final Report of the Cease-fire Commission (CCF)" at p.13.

⁸⁴ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para. 151.

⁸⁵ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para. 152.

⁸⁶ UN Blue Book, Volume V, para 11b.

⁸⁷ Final Report of the Cease-fire Commission at p.12.

⁸⁸ Berman, *op.cit.* at p. 75, footnote 60.

⁸⁹ The Secretary-General attributed some of the delay to the slow approval of the national mine clearance plan by the Cease-fire Commission and to the difficulty in identifying suitable contractors.

⁹⁰ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, p.298, para.28.