

grouped according to this typology. Note that these categories have undergone several revisions during the past twelve years, a point discussed later in this review.

7. It would be reasonable — but incorrect — to assume that the categorization of one hundred or so CBMs — effectively every CBM mentioned in the literature of the day — would mean that we were dealing with a complete universe of samples.

The assumption of universal coverage is faulty because the professional literature's collection of CBMs was developed primarily on an ad hoc, pragmatic basis in response to specific operational problems, informed only partially (at best) by simplistic and operationally-oriented informal accounts of the confidence building process. Worse, more general accounts (definitions or explanations) of confidence building appear to have been derived from the examples of proposed CBMs rather than the other way around. Completing the cycle, the inferred understanding of confidence building (based largely on pragmatic CBM examples rather than a conceptually-oriented process view) informed thinking about new CBM examples.

The key to appreciating the weakness of this inductively inferred approach to understanding confidence building is recognizing that at no stage does a comprehensive, conceptually-oriented general understanding of the confidence building phenomenon have a chance to influence thinking about the scope of CBMs.

It should also be noted that not every proposed CBM was, in fact, included in the initial list of potential measures or in similar efforts by other analysts. In the original study's initial examination of CBM proposals, some were dismissed as being outside the bounds of what the majority of analysts meant by confidence building. The uncertain status of declaratory measures is a good example of a basic type that generally was not included. Some proposals that included force reduction or demilitarization also were excluded. These were too much like arms control reduction measures. The status of some verification-oriented measures also was uncertain, given that verification is often understood to be a fundamentally unilateral activity. Some confidence building provisions can facilitate or legitimate verification activities but this is only part of the verification process. Thus, even the initial collection of CBM proposals conducted for the original study involved some difficult and, ultimately, prejudicial judgements about which proposals would count and which would not.

8. The pre-1984 literature's exploration of confidence building frequently was conducted in the context of CBMs for Europe to moderate the East-West conventional military relationship, particularly its Central European armoured imbalances. Its formal focus on this context and the tendency to develop specific CBM examples with this context generally in mind makes the literature prone to charges of Eurocentric bias.

The direct effects of this form of bias should not be exaggerated, however. Although many proposed CBMs were conceived specifically with the European military relationship in mind, a number of others clearly were not. In particular, those dealing with naval and strategic nuclear issues constitute a different source of insight. Further, many of those measures developed with European conventional military force relationships in mind appear to have genuinely broader applicability. The example of the Korean peninsula immediately springs to mind. At least some Middle East cases also seem to possess a number of potential similarities as does the South Asian case of India and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, we should be concerned that the typology's raw examples disproportionately favour large-scale, land-based conventional force problems typical of Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly when the typology's menu of CBMs is used to provide the bulk of ideas for dealing with materially different security management problems. This is an issue that has not yet received adequate consideration.

9. Although the linkages connecting the category approach and its reference body of basic working definitions were not dynamic (i.e., they were not capable of reflecting changes at one end of the connection when changes occurred at the other end), it should not be assumed that the typology itself is lacking completely in dynamism. The categories *have* undergone change during the past twelve years. The changes, however, have resulted primarily from efforts to develop new, operational solutions to specific security management problems (as in the case of qualitative constraints). Change has also occurred as a result of attempts to clarify the nature of the original categories, several of which were rather muddled in their first articulation. No alterations to the basic nature of the typology, however, have yet occurred due to changes in conceptual understandings of the confidence building phenomenon itself.