apparently, an actor select a sub-optimal option.²⁹ In the realm of policy planning, and taking the Yugoslav conflict as a case of application, such an approach could provide insights into the Serbian President's, the Federal President's and Prime Minister's actions and predict their likely future behavior in each of their nested games. The problem, however, is that very few policy planners in the Department are well versed in game theoretical analysis.³⁰ Yet, a simple analytical use of Tsebelis's concepts may offer some useful insights.

CONCLUSION

21. The use of comparative politics' methodologies in the work of policy planners seems a priori justified. However, nobody would be convinced in the absence of any practical demonstration. Such an enterprise is well beyond the confine of this short paper. It would encompass the study of policy planning papers, the study of the policy planners bureaucratic and organizational environment, the interviewing of policy papers' authors in order to understand the rationale on which their analyses are based, the application of various methodologies in order to compare their conclusions on particular subject matters with those achieved by the policy planners, and so on.

18

²⁹ See George Tsebelis, <u>Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics</u> (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990).

³⁰ This can, however, easily be taught.