

proper technical, vehicular and communication equipment and with unimpeded access to and over areas in which ground forces are located".²⁶

Significantly, the document referred to both the "intention" and the "ability" to attack. Now the terms used are "risk" and "capability". These and other ideas explored at the 1958 conference resurfaced in the MBFR talks on associated measures. In some cases they are also being applied to the implementation of the Stockholm Document.

The 1958 Conference failed. The Soviet Union wanted to consider preventive measures only in the context of reductions in forces. Western countries wanted to agree on these preventive measures separately from the question of reductions. In effect, this was achieved nearly thirty years later with the signing of the Stockholm Document. The application of complementary measures to reductions and limitations of forces will be among the tasks of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The NATO strategy of forward defence puts a premium on adequate warning time. Because of this, concern about surprise attack continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, less was said about it. Partly, the view in the mid-1960s was that a rough balance of forces existed in Europe. In addition, in the late 1960s, NATO adopted its policy of flexible response. Deterrence would be made more credible, NATO members believed, by relying on conventional forces, but holding out the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons.

There were other reasons why less attention was paid to the danger of surprise attack. This period, the focus was on nuclear arms control. During planning for MBFR, there was also a perception of détente in East-West relations. A security conference on Europe was called for by the Soviet Union. However, the West insisted on negotiations for the purpose of reducing the military confrontation in Central Europe and thereby enhancing security in Europe. NATO drew attention to the need for measures on notification, observation and inspection to accompany or follow an MBFR agreement.²⁷ However, there was no explicit reference to surprise attack in the NATO declarations on MBFR at Reykjavik in 1968 and at Rome in 1970.

²⁶ Conference Document GEN/SA/10, 5 December 1958.

²⁷ Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 4-5 December 1969, paragraph 7.