

attitudes, the implications of which for the United States could be very significant.

Perhaps most important of all, however, is the greater importance attached to verification and inspection. Who would have predicted a year ago the visit by a US Secretary of Defense to the factory producing the latest Soviet bomber? For if trust is built up through verification of both treaties and military deployments (provided the latter are found to be defensive) a way towards mutual confidence may have opened that was not there before.

Two major tests lie ahead for the establishment of such confidence. The first is the reduction of strategic arms, now a first priority for both Moscow and Washington. The prospects for this agreement are clouded by two major uncertainties: the goal of such reductions, and the future of cruise missiles. As to the first uncertainty, the Reykjavik summit revealed the confusion in Washington about whether to aim for the abolition of strategic ballistic missiles or to construct defences against them. However this uncertainty is resolved, there will remain the temptation to compensate for reductions in ballistic missiles by deploying nuclear cruise missiles, the numbers of which are difficult to verify, especially at sea.

The second major test for the establishment of real confidence will be the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe. Here the obstacles to agreement may be greater in Moscow than in the West, for while the pressure of Western public opinion tends to be exerted in favour of reductions, Soviet (and Russian) traditions confer legitimacy on large standing armies, and the political risks of Soviet withdrawal from eastern Europe could be significant.

A second factor likely to slow the growth of military spending is the rising opportunity costs of such spending. New threats to public health and the natural environment create demands for preventive measures in all countries; rates of population growth plunge many poor countries deeper into debt, while at the same time the costs of modern weapons impose severe restraints on public treasuries; and perhaps most important of all, the expected rewards of military spending have largely failed to justify the effort, either because the use of armed force undermines "security" — e.g., Lebanon and Sri Lanka — or because wars can no longer be "won" in the old sense — e.g., Iran/Iraq and Afghanistan — and they kill mostly civilians.

Thus a third factor influencing our understanding of "national security" is a rise in popular awareness of the notion of "common security." The UN has begun to make this term a familiar if rather murky concept, as in the Final Document of the 1987 Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development: "Security is an overriding priority of all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights, and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions

conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development."

More recent research into climate change has reinforced the message that, unless states cooperate to meet global threats to security, and indeed begin to give these priority, independence and sovereignty will have little meaning. But global institutions to give order and leadership to such cooperation remain weak, and the most powerful nations do little to strengthen them (the United Nations is not mentioned in the "political declaration" issued at the Toronto summit of the leaders of the top seven industrial nations in June 1988). The habits of behaviour built up over forty years of Cold War as well as the dogmas of post-colonialism — e.g., "one nation, one vote" — will not yield easily to the emerging realities of the "global commons."

Nevertheless, the factors cited above are beginning to influence the policies of states. The search for the peaceful settlements of disputes in Central America, the Persian Gulf, Angola/Namibia and Kampuchea indicate some acknowledgement by great and small powers alike of the costs of the use of force. If Soviet/American relations continue to improve, Western military budgets are likely to level off. Arms continue to pour into the Middle East, but even there one may expect renewed efforts to overcome ancient animosities.

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Debate in Canada on these matters has been vigorous since the dawn of the missile age in the late 1950s exposed vulnerabilities which Canadians had thought non-existent. Defence against bombers had appeared to be feasible provided there was close cooperation with the United States, although the forms of this cooperation, and especially the storage of nuclear warheads in Canada, was a controversial issue. However, the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile weakened, if it did not destroy, the case for air defence, and Canadian defence priorities came under closer scrutiny. Support for keeping troops in Europe began to waver in the late 1960s given the incredibility of any scenario involving war in Europe which would allow Canada to reinforce her forces there. Many began to wonder if Canada had any significant role to play in the defence of the West, and even UN peacekeeping lost its attraction in the wake of new hostilities in the Middle East and American withdrawal from Vietnam.

Defence policy in the Trudeau years became a holding action, a struggle to balance commitments and capabilities. Both were cut back, but in the end commitments began to outrun capabilities. The revival of cold war tensions after 1979-1980 and a virtual doubling of American defence spending during President Reagan's first term led to reopening the Canadian debate on defence policy which Mr. Trudeau had more or less closed in 1971. The White Paper of 1987 signalled the end of policy patchwork and