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HOW THE WAR GOES.

Our intelligence from the Crimea this week is of unusual interest, as foreshadowing that general engagement upon which the fate of the Allied Expedition is not unreasonably believed to depend. We commence our narrative with a statement furnished by the well-informed correspondent of the *Morning Herald*:—

AN IMPRESSIVE CONTRAST.—English Camp, Heights of Sebastopol, December 12.—Hardly anything has occurred to break the monotony of our lives since my last letter. The French have got all their new guns mounted, even to the third parallel. They are now ready to open fire with 100 pieces (principally mortars), and only wait for us. Somehow, we have been sadly behind the French of late. The French, before the wet weather set in, made a fine military road from Kherson to their camp, so that at no time since have they been prevented from getting up all their supplies of food and ammunition. We neglected making a road, and consequently when the rainy day came carts could not traverse the track by which our cantonments are supposed to be approachable. Horses were employed to carry up provisions for the army as well as for themselves; and under the double duty died by hundreds. As our horses died the supplies of all kinds gradually decreased. First our batteries were compelled to slacken our fire for want of ammunition, and then the men were put on half rations. Both our roads and horses were in such a state that for the last month it has been impossible to move up a single gun. Fortunately for us this state of things exists no longer, at least to the same extent. The French, pitying our condition, have made us a beautiful stone road from Balaklava to the camp, and lent us their horses to take up our guns. Their horses are in far finer condition than when they first landed. It is perfectly marvellous to see how our allies have endeavored to keep both their men and their horses in the most admirable condition. It would be difficult to believe that the French have been through a campaign, so neat and orderly in their appearance, while it would be equally difficult to believe that thin, gaunt, dirty men had ever been British soldiers; but Heaven knows, it is not the fault of our poor fellows, and I only mention this difference in the hope that out here some attention, however little, may be paid to their wants. They deserve a little consideration. Our guns are now, as I have said thanks to the French, going up daily. At the end of another week we shall have about eighty new cannon in position. Several have already been placed in our different batteries. It is intended to open a second parallel of forty guns near the trench in front of the "ovens," between our right and left attacks. All the "cohorns" (a very small kind of mortar) throwing six inch shell, are to be carried forward to a trench in front of the "ovens," and used against the defenders of the Russian works. These missiles, with our fresh guns and mortars, and advanced trenches, ought to do something against the town, if we are ever to do it.—The importance of the position of the new batteries at Inkerman have been recognised by friends and foes. The Russians, when our workmen were discovered, showed their appreciation of the danger by firing shot and shell incessantly, but without in the least interrupting the progress of the work. When it was completed, the original design, of only having two batteries, was still further extended, and two more redoubts are now being thrown up higher on the hill, and in rear of the first works. The first two will be held by the French, and will mount in all four mortars of 10-inch, and 12 long 32-pounders. The two latter works are to be manned by English, and will mount four 10-inch mortars, six 68-pounders, and 10 long 32 ditto; in all there will be eight 10-inch mortars, 22 32-pounders, and six 68 ditto, bearing upon every point of the town, more especially commanding the latter. Surely we are not over sanguine in expecting some results from the fire of such a battery and, above all, one so well placed as this. It is against the shipping that this fire will be principally directed. Beyond the progress of these batteries, and a slight occasional skirmish, we have nothing to relieve the monotonous misery of our existence. Fortunately—most fortunately for all the English—the rain has ceased for the last few days, and the weather has become quite mild and warm again. Still, I am sorry to say, our best fed troops are on half rations, and some of the divisions on quarter rations; that is, living on a quarter of a pound of biscuit and a quarter of a pound of salt pork a day. Owing to the very admirable and complete nature of half and quarter of all our arrangements for this siege, the system of half and quarter rations must continue until we are supplied with some means of transporting provisions from Balaklava to the camp. Horses we have next to none. The few that remain are too weak to work, and each day diminishes their

numbers. Counting up ammunition, cavalry, artillery, and commissariat horses, we have lost between three and four thousand since the troops landed on the Crimea. In the same time the French have lost from all causes about 400. The commissariat staff of some divisions have not one horse left on which to carry up the supplies, and to make up this deficiency are allowed 200 men, who, of course, cannot carry up full rations for a whole division. But even if they were able, the men have quite enough to do without being so employed, and the expedient of using them as beasts of burden will only make larger reinforcements necessary, for most assuredly our men will sink under this double duty as soldiers and their work of horses. Depend upon it, our government will find it cheaper to keep this army properly supplied with all the necessary staff and equipments. I do not mean cheaper in point of life; in the operations of the campaign that has never been considered, or we would not be here now; but in point of economy, and economy is a subject which, I must say, has never been overlooked in carrying on this war.

FAMINE IN THE CAMP.—It is useless to try to disguise matters as to the way our troops have suffered lately. Some of them have been literally almost starving—indeed, for whole days the naval brigade did not get a single morsel, and for days previous they had been on half rations. Our men are mere spectres of their former selves, and, as a matter of course, when ill-fed and over-worked, they have an alarming proportion of sickness amongst them. Yesterday the whole way from our camp to Balaklava was quite covered with French mules, which we had borrowed to carry in such of the sick as have been invalided to Scutari, Malta, and England. 1,200 men were thus sent for embarkation at Balaklava. Half of these will never return, and the other half cannot be fit for duty for at least three or four months. I do not mean to say for a moment that such numbers are often sent in. God forbid! If such were the case the British army in the Crimea would soon become a fiction. But such numbers are sent in for invaliding nearly every fourteen days, and do not include an immense number of cases brought in daily by the ambulances to the general hospital at Balaklava, or the cases which are treated in the various regimental hospitals in the camp.—These 1,200 invalids are men who cannot be cured here, and who are sent entirely out of the Crimea. The illness of the majority of these arose, I am certain, from want of food, and want of proper food. Yet, in the midst of this general privation, our commissariat at Balaklava act as if their supplies were inexhaustible. For instance, a few days since the "Pride of the Ocean" came in from Varna with 190 live bullocks on board, and at a time when, above all others, fresh provision was wanted, yet, though the Captain of the "Pride of the Ocean" represented that he had no forage on board, and that the bullocks must die, the authorities at Balaklava for some extraordinary freak or other, refused to allow him to enter the port until five days had elapsed, by which time only eighty of the oxen were alive, and these were so miserably weak and attenuated, that some died on the landing, and hardly any were fit to eat. Again, at Eupatoria, there was a fine supply of sheep for the use of the army; 2,000 men were kept upon the beach, where there was nothing to eat, while 3,000 in good condition grazed outside the town. The 2,000 "lean kine" were sent down for the use of the troops, and were embarked in such a state that only 1,000 reached Balaklava alive, and 200 of these died the day after their landing. Your readers can imagine the condition of the survivors when I say that the average weight of each (when they were at last put out of their misery) was only 16 lb., and some even were as low as eight. The day after these miserable little skeletons were shipped at Eupatoria, the Cossacks came down and swept off our 3,000 good sheep, with about 400 head of cattle.—There are no more supplies to be got now from Eupatoria, but from Varna and Bourgas we might feed 200,000 men if our commissariat would only send steamers there, instead of keeping them, like the Harbinger (a steamer of 900 tons) which is retained as a residence for Captain Christie, R.N., when there are scores of sailing vessels which could fulfil such an important duty equally well. The truth is, we must have a radical change in the whole of our warlike arrangements. Without some improvement, reinforcements are useless; they only come out to starve slowly, or to be surprised and shot in their tents as at Inkerman. Past oversights we have already paid for in the blood of our best troops, but it is not yet too late to save us from the evils which threaten for the future, if the public will only use their eyes and see how events are managed and progressing here.

HOW THE FRENCH MANAGE.—It would be impossible to imagine a more perfect contrast than is

presented by the appearance of Balaklava and Kherson, where the French supplies are landed. At the latter place the most thorough cleanliness and good order reign in all departments. There are separate neatly-made piers for each description of supply.—Cavalry land at one, infantry at another; barrels of beef, pork, biscuits, guns, ammunition, and medical stores have each their allotted jetties, and the charge of proper officers. With such arrangements things are never out of their way. At Balaklava it is precisely the reverse—there stores and supplies of all kinds are tumbled in the mud upon the narrow beach, amid a chaotic heap of broken timber, ships' anchors sunk into the road, stones, filth, and rubbish of all kinds. Again, whenever speculators send up ships laden with such camp luxuries as flannel shirts, wine, spirits, candles, preserved meats, &c., the French instantly send round and buy the whole cargo, which is retailed afterwards to the French at cost prices. Of course it would be beneath our government to do anything of the kind, and so our officers either endure their hardships, or lighten them by paying the most awful prices to the Greeks and Maltese, who trade in our necessities. Canrobert and the French generals are to be seen each day—no matter what the state of the weather—riding round the camp, inspecting the French troops, and visiting the hospitals. On our side, I don't think since the campaign commenced a general officer was ever seen in an hospital; and for the last fortnight, as far as I can learn, not a general officer has been seen about the camp at all. Of course we believe they are in the camp; but, for all we know of their presence (excepting, always, Sir Colan Campbell), they might as well be at St. James's or Windsor. I state these facts with reluctance, though they are strictly true, and, what is more, already form the subject of bitter comment throughout our cantonments. Let our generals only show themselves among the troops, say once or twice a week, and at least appear to take some interest in their condition, I am certain it would do them as much service as a double ration.—The influence which superior officers possess over British soldiers is proverbial, and it might now be most advantageously employed in cheering up the spirits of the men depressed under privations and hardships of no common kind.

The difference between the appearance of the French troops and our own is surprising; the French are clean, appear well fed, and their elastic step and high spirits show how little they are effected by the hardships of the campaign; our men, on the contrary, look worn and ill, are unable to keep themselves smart and soldier-like, and seem to be out of humor with the whole enterprise. But it cannot be wondered at that such a difference should exist, when it is considered that the British soldier is in the trenches every alternate night, beside his duties on picquet, and the necessity of being on the alert to defend his exposed position. The French soldier, on the contrary, is in the trenches only one night out of four or five, and his whole labor is not one-third of that of our men. Whatever may be said at home of difficulties or shortcomings, the public may be sure that the chief disasters have arisen from the single fact that the British general, with a mere handful of troops, has to do work which would require some 60,000 men. The reinforcements which have been dribbled out have afforded little real relief. Arriving a few hundreds at a time, they make no appreciable diminution of the labor of the army, and, being suddenly exposed to all the hardships of the campaign, they became ineffective in great numbers. The 46th regiment has severely suffered since its arrival, and the draughts which came out in the Queen of the South have also lost a great number of men. What we want is large reinforcements, such as will enable our army to perform its part in the great work of the war, and not dwindle, as it seems likely to do, into a mere brigade attached to the French army of the Crimea.—*Times Correspondent.*

THE RUSSIAN PLAN.—The Russian army under Liprandi, which, for so many weeks, has been our near neighbor at Balaklava, still haunts the favored spot. They have only withdrawn about two miles and a half from their old cantonments in the plain. About 25,000 appear to have there fallen back to the south, while a *corps d'armee*, 15,000 or 20,000 strong, has posted itself near Inkerman—very close to the spot from which such a desperate attack was made on our right on the 5th of November. Liprandi's object in thus dividing his force is not known, though, as far as I can conjecture, it seems as if an attack were meditated on our advanced battery at Inkerman. No matter what may be said to the contrary, I am quite convinced Liprandi's force has been lately strengthened. When he first attacked our entrenchments on the 25th of October, he had 38,000 men; and now, when he must have lost considerably from sickness and other causes, he

has, at least, 45,000 with him—that is, counting the force at Inkermann and on the Tchernaya. Finer weather seems now to have set in. Cavalry and artillery, in two or three days more, will be able to manoeuvre on any ground, and then you may expect news of another battle. Depend upon it, 45,000 men, under an able general, will not stay quiet in their cantonments, watching us destroying Sebastopol, without some desperate efforts to relieve the place and raise the siege.

THE SICK AND WOUNDED.—On the 11th upwards of 1,200 sick were brought down from the front to Balaklava, and there shipped on board various transports to be conveyed to Scutari. These were the accumulation of nearly three weeks, and their presence in the camp was a great hindrance to active operations, should such become advisable or necessary. For several days attempts had been made to transport them along the seven miles of wretched road which stretch from Sebastopol to the British landing-place; but 25 was the greatest number which could be brought down in a day, until the assistance of the French was asked for. Our Allies at once furnished 200 mules, each having two seats for wounded men; and in a few hours 1,206 unfortunate fellows in various stages of illness were brought down safely to Balaklava. They were placed on board the steamers *Cleopatra*, *Victoria*, and *City of London*, the last towing a dismasted sailing ship, which contained a considerable number. It is certainly not a praiseworthy proceeding to place these large numbers of helpless men in vessels which are unfit for sea, and which, if the hawser by which they are attached to the towing vessels happens to break, must necessarily be lost. The *Victoria*, a long four-masted steamer, had been much injured in the gale of the 14th of November. Her rudder had been carried away, and she was totally unmanageable. Yet 400 sick were placed on board, and she was sent to sea with the *Cleopatra*, a ship of equal size, which had enough to do to take care of herself. The master of the *Victoria* had rigged a temporary rudder, which, however, turned out to be wholly useless. The *Cleopatra* had, in the darkness of a December night, to follow the tossing vessel and endeavor to get a hawser on board. The *Victoria*, which lay on the water like a log, came into collision with her, carried away three boats and a great part of the bulwarks, and for a minute it was uncertain whether the *Cleopatra*, with all on board, would not go to the bottom. After being taken in tow, the immense steamer broke the hawser twice, and after being three days out the two vessels found themselves down by the Asiatic coast near Heraclea. The transit occupied four days, in which 16 men died on board the *Cleopatra*, and, it is said, a still larger number on board the *Victoria*. If sick must be put on board vessels which are unmanageable without assistance, there ought at least to be proper steam tugs employed for the service, and no repetitions of such hazardous experiments as that which I have related. The effective British force may now be about 18,000 men, exclusive of 1,200 who have by this time arrived in the Royal Albert, and 300 artillerymen sent out to supply the places of those killed or disabled in the trenches. But, though every addition is most acceptable, it must be boldly stated that the reinforcements are by no means in proportion to the demands of this great war; and, as may be seen from the comparison of numbers, really do little more than make up the deficiency caused by illness and fatigue. It is not enough that the British army should be kept up to an effective strength of 20,000 men, though even that is not done. At least 35,000 men are required to hold with anything like security the position we occupy; and in justice to our devoted troops they ought not to be exposed to such terrible fatigues they now undergo. A fortnight since the Russians in a sortie bayoneted several men of the 50th in their blankets; such was the deep, death-like sleep of the poor fellows, that they could not be roused in time to escape the attack of their comparatively fresh and vigorous foe.

We ought not to look too exclusively to French reinforcements. The French army, though numerous, has its limits; and, furthermore, it is not to our honor to play a merely secondary part in such a struggle as this. The Allies have commenced the war on the principles of equality, but that equality will soon be at an end if Britain considers that by furnishing transports and money she has done all that is required of her, and that a small detachment of troops is sufficient to sustain her power and reputation in the east. The French will probably soon have 100,000 men in the Crimea, while there is at present no sign of any real increase of the British force. During the last week a large battery has been formed on the right attack; and the following guns have been carried up, with great labor from Balaklava. The 13-inch mortars, four 32-pounders, and twelve long 24-pounders. It is expected that these will be able to reach the shipping in whatever position the Russian may place them.