

tively foreknown, that man, when created, would transgress, and entail upon himself an existence of eternal unutterable misery? Taking these issues in their order, let it be observed,—

(1.) That the whole intrinsic value of all that God has formed in the boundless empire of his universe, centers in the virtue of the moral intelligences where-with it is peopled. Remove these intelligences, and the physical universe resolves itself into a gigantic meaningless plaything; the whole wisdom of its construction resting entirely in its adaptation to the development of moral intelligences, as affording them a field of action, in which to establish their claim to the awards of the virtuous.

(2.) That the movements of the physical and moral universe differ simply in one *essential* particular:—in the first class of movements there is no choice—everything done is the result of stern irresistible necessity; the power of moving otherwise than is witnessed, not being, in any sense or in any degree, an attribute of the whole or of any part of the physical universe; while, in the moral universe, movements are *never* the result of irresistible forces brought to bear upon the actor—indeed the bare supposition of such an act, places it at once beyond the limits of the moral law—which, in every such case, relieves the actor, alike fully and completely from praise and blame; the law holding each individual responsible for his conduct, in just and fair proportion to the degree of intelligent control which he possesses, *or should have possessed*, over his own actions.

(3.) But while it is true that God's created universe, in all the complexity of its evolutions, must be viewed as an empty plaything, if bereft of its intelligent inhabitants—inhabitants, whose intrinsic value, as compared with the physical universe, rests wholly in those endowments which enable them to choose one course of action in preference to another,—a choice by which they demonstrate the possession of an intelligent control over their own movements,—a control from which may accrue to them praise or blame—all this being true, it is further necessary to observe, that, if all the courses of action submitted to the choice of these intelligences, were all in themselves equally good, then, as a matter of course, no blame whatever could attach to any of these intelligences, let their choice of a course of conduct be what it might—inasmuch as every course chosen must be good of necessity, where the choice of a wrong or improper course is impossible; but movements, good, right and proper of necessity, furnish no key to the moral character of the actors; and hence are as valueless in a moral point of view as the evolutions of a wheel or the movements of a planet; and hence we arrive at the conclusion that evil courses of conduct as well as good must be submitted to the choice of moral intelligences, before either virtue or vice can be attributed to them as consequences of action; so that it is as absolutely impossible to secure moral conduct from a being destitute of the

power to do wrong as well as right, as it is to obtain motion from machinery that is not subject to the impediment of friction. To have a machine in motion, is to have friction—to have a moral being in action, is to have a responsible intelligence possessing power to do wrong and therefore the sage wisdom of framing man without the power of violating the Divine law, is simply the consummate folly of peopling this earth with inhabitants of no more value than itself, instead of with beings, any one of whom is of infinitely more value than ten thousand worlds.

To these deductions of reason, we will now add the teachings of Divine truth.

All admit, that man, at his creation, was placed under a penal law by the God of reason. (Gen. 2:17.)

A God of reason, could not enjoin a penal law upon a being who did not possess power to break it.

Hence, it must have been known to God, that in creating man, he had endowed him with powers to break the law which he enjoined upon him.

Glancing from man upwards to angelic orders, the Scriptures definitely teach that the first estate of certain angels was lost to them *by transgression*; as their transgression brought punishment upon them, it involved a violation of penal law.—(2nd Pet. ii. 4 and Jude, 6.

Without the power, angels could not have infringed on such a law, and therefore they as well as men, were formed with power to violate the Law of God. And thus we find that facts, in the case of both angels and men, go to sustain our general position, that the power of doing wrong as well as of doing right—the power of breaking law as well as of keeping it, is ABSOLUTELY INDESPENSABLE, in constituting a moral intelligence of any grade that shall be capable of acquiring the character of virtuous, or of becoming worthy of praise or blame.

On thus discovering the defenceless character of its *first* issue after flying from the open field, universalism is wont to immediately fall back into the intrenchments of its *second* issue, and to contend,

That a God of *infinite* benevolence could not be so cruel as to create man, with the positive foreknowledge, that he, on being created, would certainly sin, and entail upon himself endless unutterable misery.

As in this issue universalism throws itself upon the reasonableness of a deduction from Scriptural facts, it is necessary to test its soundness by reason, taking care that no important fact is omitted.

Let it be observed, then, that in this issue, the only parties whose interests are taken into consideration, are those who wickedly entail upon themselves endless misery! But is it true that these are the only parties interested in the question of man's creation? Is it right to keep entirely out of view, in such a question as this, that "MULTITUDE, which no man could number"? Are *they* not interested in the question of man's creation? Is their eternal glory and inf-