

ness altogether out of his definition of evolution, yet he elsewhere recognizes the fact that it is the consciousness which evolves. In "Principles of Psychology" §. 378, he says: The lowest form of consciousness that can be conceived is that resulting from the alteration of two states. When there is a change from state A to state B, and from state B to state A . . . there have arisen two relations of likeness between primitive states of consciousness. . . . And by a perpetual repetition of these changes A—B, B—A, the two states and their two relations tend to become more and more cognizable. Thus, even in a consciousness of the lowest imaginable type, there are foreshadowed the relation of sequence, the relation of unlikeness among the sensations, and the relation of likeness among the sensations, the relation of unlikeness among the changes, and the relation of likeness among the changes. The earliest possible experiences are those supplying the raw material from which these cognitions are developed. Suppose a third state C is now joined to the others, further relations of likeness and unlikeness between states and changes result. . . . And we have but to conceive an endless progress in this consolidation of changes, to comprehend how there can arise the consciousness of complex things, how the objects with which human intelligence deals become thinkable as like and unlike—how the highest acts of perception and reason become possible." Thus, although he has excluded consciousness from his definition of evolution, no one could have shown more clearly that the essence of evolution is the development of consciousness. But Spencer seems to think that consciousness is the result of change, as noise is the result of the action of a rip saw. He does not say so, but he does say, (Prin. of Psy. §. 377): "It is admitted on all hands that without change consciousness is impossible."

If he means by this that change precedes consciousness, then it is sheer absurdity. There certainly could be no change without consciousness. Change without consciousness is un-

thinkable. All changes as far we know, as far as we can think, are not the causes but the results of consciousness.

Some have thought that this is a rash statement, but in this I am supported by Spencer himself. At the beginning of § 18, of "First Principles" he says: "On lifting a chair the force exerted we regard as equal to that antagonistic force coiled the weight of the chair; and we cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like in kind, since equality is conceivable only between things that are connatural . . . Yet contrariwise, it is incredible that the force as existing in the chair really resembles the force as present in our minds. . . . Since the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force existing in the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to think of force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all". Thus Spencer admits the inconceivability of change without thinking of it as the result of the consciousnesses of the things changing, yet he assumes that changes do occur that are not the results of consciousness.

On the other hand, if we grant that consciousness is the result of changes, then the mind cannot conceive of a result of changes progressing. To say that consciousness is the result of change, that it has no existence apart from change, is to say that it has no existence *per se*, that it is, in fact, nothing. How could nothing learn something by experience, and be merry or sad over it, as it feels tickled or tormented. If consciousness were produced by change, as noise is produced by a rip saw, each change would give birth to a new consciousness separate and distinct from the consciousness produced by any other change, and the consciousness produced by any must be co-existent with the change, beginning when the change begins and ending when the change ends. No matter how many changes might occur, either simultaneous or successive, there could be no possible relation between the consciousness of a