

- Monday's election - our last
- Absorption by U.S. - inevitable

# DEATH OF A NATION

By RICHARD J. NEEDHAM  
(The Globe and Mail)

There are few greater follies in this world than to predict what will happen in the far future - or in the near future either. Few people would have believed, in 1930, that within 10 years a rearmend and revitalized Germany would have conquered and occupied France and be within an inch of conquering and occupying Britain. Few people would have believed, in 1945, that within 20 years a proud, capable and truculent China would have given white Western troops a bloody nose in Korea, would have acquired the atomic bomb, and would have established itself as one of the world's great powers.

History is always producing the unexpected, the unpredicted and unpredictable, and this is easily understood when it is recognized that history is made by the actions and reactions of three and a half billion human beings, each with the whole human range of hopes and fears, of good and evil, of cruelty and greed, of obstinacy and irrationality. As Herbert Butterfield remarks in that truly great book, *Christianity and History*, if there were no more folly and willfulness in the world than exists in any roomful of people - it would be more than enough to start a third global war.

"The world is not respectable; it is mortal, tormented, confused, deluded forever." Thus said the great Spanish-American philosopher, George Santayana, and he was right. The world's a great melting pot, a witches' caldron, a Donnybrook Fair, a huge drunken Friday night brawl out of which anything - absolutely anything - can and does come.

It is with some hesitation, therefore, that I set down my beliefs - perhaps, I should say, my guess on the basis of observed factors - that Canada will not long endure as a nation; that having begun its existence as a colony of France, then of Britain, it is now to all intents a colony of the United States, an outpost of the American empire; and that in time - perhaps sooner, perhaps later - Canada will become part of that wealthy, powerful and expansive nation.

I am not looking ahead to this as a bad thing or as a good thing. Certain advantages would accrue from it and certain disadvantages. And of course, we must always bear in mind that change is the great rule of history, the great law of this world. It is not necessarily a bad thing, and may often be a good thing, for a small country to become part of a larger one - as Scotland did when it went in with England; as Newfoundland did when it went in with Canada. This country itself represents a form of incorporation - smaller units such as Nova Scotia and British Columbia going in with larger ones such as Upper and Lower Canada to form Confederation. I think it is the future of this Confederation to go in with a still larger one, the Confederation to the south. I think this national election is not the last, but one of the last, Canada is going to have.

You may wonder, as I often have, just how and why this state of affairs came about; just how and why Canada is proceeding to lose its national independence so soon after gaining it. This is not the fault, or the accomplishment, of this generation of Canadians, or of any particular person, party or government; it is the inevitable consequence of certain factors which are mainly in the past, indeed the remote past. Take, first and foremost, the matter of population.

In all Canada, there are fewer than 20 million people - roughly as many as live in New York State alone. In all the United States, there are 195 million people, and there will very soon be 200 million. The pressure of these 195 million people exerts itself across the most open border in the world, upon a country speaking largely the same language as the United States, and with a culture largely similar.

The United States came into existence with exactly the same number of people as Canada had. There were 3.5 million people in the 13 colonies which successfully rebelled against Britain in 1776; there were 3.5 million people in the Canada which came into existence in 1867. Why did one grow so large while the other remained so small?

The chief answer is that almost from the beginning the United States pursued a continuous policy - ended only in the early Twenties - of large-scale immigration. Canada did not. We had a dose of it in the early years of the century under the Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier; another dose after the First World War; and a final dose, of which Toronto has been the major beneficiary, after the Second World War. But the treatment has never been large, or continuous. In the population sense, Canada has never had any long-term policy of nation-building.

In the United States, there was such a policy. The United States, after 100 years, had 50 million people; Canada, after 100 years, will have perhaps 21 million. When the United States marked its centennial with those 50 million people in 1876, it still had 50 years of massive immigration ahead of it; can we say this for Canada as it approaches its centennial in 1967? Is there any real intention to fill up what seems still an empty country? Was there ever such an intention?

I do not think there was. I do not think that Canada consciously set out - as the United States consciously set out - to become a nation, either before or after Confederation. We began at the end of the Eighteenth century - as a group of French-speaking colonists left high and dry by Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham; and as a group of English-speaking colonists in whom Britain was not particularly interested. The only ambition of these early Canadians was a negative one - not to become Americans, but to maintain some sort of separate existence north of the border.

The French Canadians did not want immigration because this would mean they would be out-numbered by the English-speaking Canadians; Lower Canada, now Quebec, actually had more people than Upper Canada, now Ontario, until the Eighteen Fifties. The English Canadians were not enthusiastic about immigration because they were nicely entrenched in a sort of plantation economy, not unlike that of the Old South. They didn't want a lot of common people rocking the boat, introducing such radical ideas as democracy, and making trouble for what we would now call the clerical, military, commercial and governmental establishment.

There was no urge to build a nation then, and there was no



Monday's national election may be one of the last; Pensions, scandal and medicare have been discussed at length in the campaign, but, he says, perhaps the most important issue of all has been neglected - the likelihood that Canada will not long endure as a nation, that its absorption by the United States is inevitable.

urge to build a nation in 1867. Some will say, "How about Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy?" but this was simply a tariff protection measure, designed to help domestic industry against the growing competition of U.S. manufacturers. Some will say, "How about the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway?" but this was mainly a negative measure, designed to placate British Columbia and prevent it from slipping into the hands of the United States. There was no thought of building up the Canadian West until Laurier became Prime Minister in 1896, with Clifford Sifton as his Immigration Minister. By that time, the United States had taken the mass of emigrants from Europe and had a population of 70 million against Canada's five million.

## FEW NATIONAL LEADERS

Going back through Canada's history for the past 200 years, one finds very few men who could be called national leaders - men determined, or anxious, or even willing, to make Canada a great, or an important, or even a viable nation. There were several reasons for this. There was the continuous conflict between English and French, aggravated by the immigration of fanatical Orange elements from Northern Ireland. The Orange Order has been a disaster to Canada generally and to Ontario particularly and I am glad to have witnessed its virtual demise.

There has always been a southward flow of people with brains, spirit and courage. Confronted by the conservatism and often bigotry of Canada's Establishment, they went down to the United States where things were open, where there was no Family Compact, no entrenched or privileged class. Our Washingtons and Lincolns and Tom Paines and Jeffersons went to the country of Washington and Lincoln and Tom Paine and Jefferson.

Some are inclined to think that just as the United States became an independent nation in 1776, Canada became an independent nation in 1867. That is not the case. The Canada that emerged in 1867 was a confederation of colonies which in itself was still very much of a colony; it was only in 1931, with the proclamation of the Statute of Westminster, that Canada attained the sovereignty the United States fought to win in 1776. The idea of Canadian nationhood goes back only 50 years, to our participation in the First World War; and a good half of that 50-year period was pre-empted by the depression of the Thirties with its shattering effect on Canadian morale, by our participation in the Second World War, and by the postwar recovery. The only periods we had for nation-building, if anyone cared about nation-building, were in the Twenties, when Canada was led, or rather presided over, by Mackenzie King; and the Fifties, when the seats of federal power were occupied by Louis St. Laurent and John Diefenbaker.

In Canada, momentous decisions have a way of being made by accident, default or improvisation rather than in any considered sense of national purpose. Consider four important matters - currency, language, trade unionism and investment.

In their early stages of industrial development, both the United States and Canada needed large infusions of foreign capital, but there was a difference in the means they chose of getting it. The United States, in general, borrowed the money in the form of bonds; when the bonds had been paid off or defaulted on, that was the end of the matter; the Americans had full ownership. Canada, in general, tended to take the money in the form of direct investment, which of course left the ownership in the hands of the foreign investor.

That's one difference; here's another. With the aid of mass immigration, low taxes, high profits and an unorganized labor force, the United States rapidly built up huge capital resources of its own. That country had been in existence 140 years before it introduced the graduated income tax; Canada had been in existence only 50 years when it did the same thing. Canada moved quite early into a high-tax, low-profit existence. It did not create its own capital resources; and, to the extent that it did, tended to put them in "safe" investments - bonds, insurance, mortgages and such - rather than in the chancy ones like gas and oil. We left the big risks at first to British investors; later, to U.S. investors, who saw their opportunity and quite properly took it - to the point where they now own something like half our industrial system.

Turning to the matter of currency, during its earlier years, Canada had a wild assortment of French playing cards, Hudson's Bay Company tokens, British shillings and pounds, American gold eagles and Spanish pieces of eight. It was a mess and in 1858 the decision was made to clean it up by adopting the same dollars-and-cents decimal system as the United States.

Those Americans who looked to the ultimate annexation of Canada - there were many then and I suspect there are many now - must have rejoiced in the decision for it made things that much easier for them. It made Canada's economic system that much less British or European or even Canadian, and that much more American. It meant that Canadians always could, and would, directly compare their own prices and wages with those prevailing in the United States. It meant that Canadians, directly confronted with the material disadvantages of their separate existence, would think less of their non-material advantages.

Directly related to the matter of prices and wages is the matter of trade unionism. The border between the two countries is the most open in the world today; in earlier times it was virtually non-existent. Americans quite casually wandered across into Canada for work; Canadians, in far greater numbers, wandered down to the United States. Bakers and barbers, railwaymen and industrial workers, had an international sort of existence, which resulted in the growth of so-called "international" unions - international only in the sense that they embraced the unionized workers of two adjacent countries.

This is another aspect of Canada's unwillingness to become in the full sense a nation. Britain has large U.S. investments, but has its own national labor movement. So do France, Germany, Australia, Japan - any country you care to name. Canada alone, of all the countries in the world, has a labor movement with headquarters in another country, under another flag.

The consequence of so-called international unionism is that a Canadian factory worker sees a U.S. worker, doing the same job and belonging to the same union, getting as much as a dollar an hour more than he does. The result is a continuous upward pressure, both physical and psychological, on Canadian wages, and therefore on prices. I don't believe this is good for Canada's national interest, but it is good for the national interests of the United States. Here, without passing moral judgments, we must take a cold look at the cold realities of politics and history.

It is clearly against the interest of the United States that Canada should be a large and powerful nation. No large and powerful nation wants another large and powerful nation next door to it. It is clearly against the interest of the United States that Canada should fill up its empty spaces through large-scale immigration. It is clearly against the interest of the United States that Canada should process all of its own raw material, use all of its own fuel and water, and thus have none left over for export south.

## A POWERFUL CANADA NOT WANTED

It is clearly against the interests of the United States that Canada should be competitive with the United States in wages and, especially, in prices. It is clearly against the interests of the United States that Canada should be a modern, industrial nation. It is clearly in the interests of the United States that Canada should remain pretty much as it is and what it is today - a semi-industrial colony producing manufactured goods at high costs in relation to world markets, producing raw materials at low costs for export to the industrial plants below the line.

To what extent these U.S. interests are protected through U.S. control over Canadian labor, or through U.S. control over Canadian

governments, I do not presume to say. I simply say that one should not be idealistic or dreamy-eyed about Canada's situation on the upper half of the North American continent.

Viewing history in practical terms, it must be - and indeed it should be - Washington's policy to do in Canada, and with Canada, not those things which are suitable to Canadian interests, but those things which are suitable to its own interests - up to and including the eventual incorporation of Canada's people and, especially, Canada's resources into the United States.

And what of the tormented issue of language? It was settled by Wolfe's victory in 1759 that English should be the ruling language of Canada. It was settled vaguely by the Quebec Act of 1774 and precisely by the British North America Act of 1867 that French-Canadians would have their own language (here I simplify) in Quebec and Ottawa.

As the years went by, with virtually no immigration from France, and with substantial immigration from Britain, the United States and other non-French countries, the English language became thoroughly dominant in most parts of Canada. Thus Canada was left with the same currency system as the United States, and also the same language. This was not a conscious decision of national policy, but something that just happened.

The Canadians and their leaders never wanted to build a nation; but most of the time, especially in the Nineteenth Century, they did want to remain separate and different from the United States. Given that wish, might they not have been wiser to have deliberately adopted French as the language of the nation? Might they not have been wiser to have had a currency system of francs and centimes, or ecus and louis d'or? Isn't a small country hurting its own chances of cultural, political and economic survival against a much larger neighbor when it uses the same language and the same currency?

Two countries are in the same position as Canada - a few people next door to a lot. Next door to the Soviet Union, with its 200,000,000 people are 4,000,000 Finns. Do the Finns speak Russian? No, they speak Finnish. Do they use roubles and kopeks? No, they use Finnmark and penna. These factors have something to do with Finland's national survival.

Or, take Mexico - 40,000,000 Mexicans up against 195,000,000 Americans. The Mexicans speak Spanish, not English; they use pesos and centavos, not dollars and cents. And they have their own labor movement - large, strong and intensely nationalistic.

## AMERICAN CONTROL OF INDUSTRY

Throughout Canada's history, something was happening over which it had no control. Britain, never much interested in Canada, was going down as a commercial, industrial and military power; the United States was coming up. Canada's dealings with the one nation shrank; with the other, vastly expanded, as British America became less and less British, more and more American.

Today, the United States takes two-thirds of all Canada's exports, mainly in the form of raw materials, and provides two-thirds of all our imports, mainly in the form of completely finished products. The United States controls more than half Canada's manufacturing, more than half the mining and smelting, more than half the production of oil and natural gas. Some key industries - such as rubber and automobile production - are under almost complete U.S. ownership. Americans control one of every three Canadian companies worth more than \$1,000,000; two out of every three worth more than \$25,000,000.

Canada's automobile industry has been meshed with that of the United States; other industries will be doing the same thing. Just as our oil, natural gas and electric power have been continentalized, so will our resources of fresh, clean water undergo the same process. No allegedly independent country has ever placed itself so much in the economic grasp of another.

But the process is more than economic. U.S. nuclear missiles and air bases stand on Canada's soil, Canada's armed forces are, for all practical purposes, part of the U.S. armed forces and, I predict, will be fighting alongside them in Vietnam within a year or two. U.S. publications flood Canadian newsstands. Switch on the radio to almost any Canadian station and the program will likely be of U.S. origin. The same will likely happen if you tune your television set to any Canadian channel, including those of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Canadian political leaders go to Washington as respectfully as they once went to London. Wall maps used by great U.S. corporations do not indicate any border at all between Canada and the United States; there's just the Dallas region, the Washington region, the Toronto region, the Winnipeg region; and this is a portent for the future.

From being a French colony, and then a British colony, we have come to being an American one; and we seem likely to end up, some day in the not-too-far future, underneath the American flag - underneath, as the University of California students impolitely call it, Old Glory.

I do not see how this tide can be turned, and I am not at all convinced that the majority of Canadians, French-speaking or English-speaking, even want to turn it - or want to do the things that are necessary if it is to be turned. Canadians, as I have seen them, are a rather docile people, content to accept existing situations, unwilling to make drastic changes, none too keen on gambles or risks, dangers or adventures, hardships or sacrifices.

We are keen on what is called social security, and have set up elaborate welfare schemes which now cost us roughly \$4 billion a year - enough in five years to buy out the entire U.S. investment in Canada. But the money is not being used for that purpose, nor is any Canadian leader suggesting it should be so used.

Both as individuals and as corporations, Canadians pay an extraordinarily high income tax, sharply limiting the amount of Canadian capital available for investment in Canada. This compels us to turn to U.S. capital, and so the U.S. investment can be expected to grow rather than diminish - still another part of the price we pay for our massive schemes of "social security".

It is a curiosity of Canadian history that in about 50 years we went from the frontier state to the welfare state - the boy in the rocking chair, the young man making out his will, the new country with its vast underdeveloped resources looking to the future not with hope or with excitement but with fear.

I do not argue that Canada's disappearance as a separate nation, its absorption into the United States, would be either a good thing or a bad thing. Given such absorption, it seems likely that we would become wealthier; we would quickly have more population, and our resources would be more speedily developed. We would be better defended; 20 million people could never protect this vast country against the Russians, the Chinese, or any other possible invader.

On the other hand, given such absorption, it seems likely that we would have a lot more trouble with crime than we have now. We would have a color problem - an American color problem - which we do not have now. Our politics and politicians would be even more corrupt than they are now. French Canada would get short shrift in the matter of language, education and culture. Our young men would be conscripted for faraway wars.

The past companies didn't mention our coming death - just our old age pensions.

## LETTER FROM MacFADDEN

# AN APOLOGY FROM MORLEY


Dear Sir:  
Just caught up with your thinking on the problems of editors (Gazette, Friday, Oct. 29). I see you say I was once a member of the Communist Party of Canada - when I guess what you meant was that my critics say I was once a member etc. Even Terry Morley slips up on occasion.

Anyway my initial reaction was to fire off a letter saying how I have never been etc. My second thoughts were better, however, and I puked gently into the garbage can when I thought of my first thoughts. It's amazing how history repeats itself. Remember when Joe used to come belting into the Senate

waving this piece of paper and yelling, "I have 200 names"? Point being that the sheet was blank. Or when he used to say that the White House was full of Communists and homosexuals?

And people wanted to know whether they could belong to both groups? The point of all this being that we must never get caught up in the denial bit again. That way lies lies disaster. The reaction against the new student activism is just beginning and it's coming from the same quarters as always. That's why the life of editors in Quebec now is so short. But we hold out where we can. The past companies didn't mention our coming death - just our old age pensions.

I think your idea of a pub-



## YOUNG IDEALISTS-

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Surely it is more sensible to urge a policy that would avoid both war and capitulation. Surely one can be committed to both peace and freedom. A policy to serve both interests intelligently must take risks, but the size of the risk and how far one should push it can only be determined in specific situations.

John Kennedy's astute manoeuvring in the Cuban missile crisis exemplifies the pragmatic method in international affairs. I think the doctrinaire absolutists -- the people who believe non-violence is the answer to everything -- would have found their idealism badly shaken by the misfortunes which would have accompanied the acceptance of their advice. The doctrinaire left complained that Kennedy went too far. They pleaded that the U.S. avoid such unilateral boldness; at the very least, they argued, the problem should have been placed before the United Nations.

The doctrinaire right, by comparison, said that Kennedy hadn't gone far enough. They wanted an immediate invasion of Cuba. Kennedy responded with pragmatic wisdom. His objectives were peace and freedom. He tempered boldness with restraint. His naval blockade was bold enough to persuade the Soviets he meant business but restrained enough to enable the Soviets to back away without confrontation. He steered a course somewhere between the point at which he could not back down and the point at which they could not back down.

Pragmatic idealists see not only the potential in their values, but also the limitations. Public ownership could achieve much, but it never deserved religious reverence. Non-violence is a noble goal, but it does not merit unequivocal obedience. My real concern is for the survival of the exciting idealism that's part of campus life in the Sixties.

I'm afraid that if it hardens into religious absolutism it will inevitably die in a collision with unpleasant reality. If, on the other hand, it cultivates a healthy, sceptical pragmatism, it could inspire a renaissance in western democracy.

Patrick MacFadden,  
Editor-in-Chief  
McGill Daily

ED.  
Dear Patrick:  
Thanks for forbearing on the lawsuit.

I must say that your critics must also be great friends of the CP, since I can't think of any

group that wouldn't be proud to claim you.

I goofed and I publicly apologize.

I hope this won't impair the good relations between the Daily and the Gazette, and I hope even more that you will give me a chance to apologize privately.

One more thing. The vote at your Student Forum upholding your right to publish a first class newspaper that actually forces people to do a bit of thinking, is a great tribute to you personally. It gave us here a hell of a lot of satisfaction.

I'll do penance at Calgary.

Terry Morley,  
Editor-in-Chief  
Dalhousie Gazette