

External Affairs

fulfilled its obligation to at least the same extent as some governments which we do recognize now, and about whose political systems we have the same kind of reservations.

I have just mentioned the legal factors, the legal conditions for recognition. This does not mean, however, that any government which has fulfilled these legal requirements is automatically entitled to recognition. This is a decision that should only be taken on the basis of national and international interests. It is to such considerations that I now address myself. It is stated that if Canada recognized China, greater opportunities for trading with the Chinese mainland would be created. There would almost inevitably follow an era of renewed friendly relations with that country. By this argument diplomatic recognition is made the key to trading relations with China. I must say, however, that I know of nothing to suggest that recognition would bring increased trade.

In so far as some western countries that have recognized China are concerned, no benefits in the matter of trading have accrued from that act. On the other hand, others, without recognizing communist China, have seen their trade grow substantially. It is true that on occasion Peking has used the question of trade as a special weapon. I would draw to the attention of the house the fact that the Peking government has used trade as a political weapon. I am thinking of the action in 1958 when that government cut off trade with Japan and later with Malaya and Singapore because the governments of those states acted in a certain way, within their own jurisdiction and within their own prerogatives as sovereign governments, but which the communists considered unsatisfactory. I do not regard trade, in that context, as being an argument in favour of recognition.

I would point out further that there are dangers inherent in trading with communist China. There are, however, other arguments in favour of recognition. It is undeniable that, unless the government which has effective control of the mainland of China is represented at international meetings, there will be less possibility of settling issues that create tensions and endanger the peace of the world today. This is in no way to say, however, that we cannot deal at all with communist China. The west has done so at Geneva when discussions took place on topics relating to Korea and Indochina. The United States is doing that very thing now in the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. It does not follow, either, that if we and other friendly governments were to recognize communist China all the problems which beset us in the Far East would immediately be solved. This

is to say that non-recognition of communist China is a symptom and not a cause of the tensions which endanger peace in the Far East.

What really is required, fundamentally, is a desire on the part of the Chinese to settle the outstanding problems. I mean to say that the pronouncements of the Peking government on international affairs in the past year, which is under review, give few grounds for believing that they are actually interested in removing those causes of discord separating them from the west.

It remains true, however that the present exclusion of China—and I come back to this point—from the United Nations and other councils of the world, except in isolated instances, makes international diplomacy more difficult to carry on. Disarmament is a case which I have in mind. What would be the use of an agreement or a treaty with respect to the cessation of nuclear tests—and I give this just by way of an example—if mainland China was not somehow involved in the working out and implementation of such a treaty? I must observe also, Mr. Speaker, that the authority and prestige of the United Nations has been weakened to some extent because many important international negotiations, such as those on Korea and Indochina, have not taken place within that organization.

I trust—and I say this very carefully—that I am not being unfair if I say that some of the arguments in favour of immediate recognition of communist China seem to me to overlook, to a certain extent, the complex nature of the problem. The problem of relations with communist China is an extraordinarily delicate one, for however much we may wish to develop an acceptable basis for relations with this increasingly important Asian state, it is by no means clear that recognition would accomplish this end. Indeed, we could contemplate that it would give rise to fresh problems.

The attitude that I commend to the house is one of prudence based on an appreciation of the realities of the situation. This government has taken a positive attitude with respect to trade. My colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Churchill) this afternoon in the house mentioned one aspect of that trade. I remind the house that in 1957—and these figures have been presented already this session to the house—our trade with China amounted to \$1½ million. In 1958 this figure rose to \$7.7 million. In the difficult question of exports by Canadian subsidiaries of United States firms, as a result of the Prime Minister's discussions with President Eisenhower in July of last year, we have an understanding with the government of the United States