

NORAD—Canada—U.S. Agreement

Indeed, on March 11, 1957, 40 copies of a submission to the cabinet committee on defence were approved by the Minister of National Defence and forwarded to the secretary of the cabinet defence committee for inclusion on the agenda of the meeting of that committee to be held on Friday, March 15. No action was taken thereon. The agreement into which we have entered represents, in almost complete measure—when I say almost complete measure there are slight deviations in terminology and in routine matters—that which had been, to all intents and purposes, agreed upon by the former minister of national defence on behalf of the then government.

However, between March 11 and April 26 changes had taken place. An election was not far around the corner. For some reason, that election being set for June 10, a decision was made that further consideration would not be given to this matter until June 15. Oh, Mr. Speaker, that was more than a coincidence. On April 26 the secretary of the Canadian chiefs of staff advised the secretary of the United States joint chiefs of staff that the Canadian chiefs of staff had completed action on this matter and were awaiting governmental approval, but it was not expected that the Canadian government would be able to deal with this matter before June 15.

I mention these matters, sir, by way of answer in anticipation of some of the arguments that have been advanced in recent months regarding these questions; some of the criticisms that were made in the last election campaign. It was alleged on occasions that we had lost political control of our own forces. It was contended that what we had done breached Canadian sovereignty. What we have done has been done without diminution in any way of Canadian sovereignty, and without placing ourselves in a position whereby in the interests of survival we would fail on the North American continent to do that which is expected not only by Canada but the other nations within NATO on the European continent.

The result of Canadian participation in an arrangement such as this is not the loss of sovereignty or survival, it is survival with the maintenance of sovereignty. I underline these words as interpretative of what actually has been done. In other words, none of us in this house has any monopoly of the desire to maintain the sovereignty of this land. It has not, however, been accepted as any diminution of sovereignty that, under the NATO arrangement, our troops and our air force personnel in Europe are under the authority of the chiefs of NATO. We en-

tered into that agreement with that realization. If it is necessary, however, and acceptable under NATO, I ask you, sir, why there has been so much said regarding this agreement the purposes of which are, first and foremost and finally, the preservation and maintenance of survival itself within our country.

I want to mention something about NATO. In introducing this matter I should point out that article 6 of the NATO treaty provides:

For the purpose of article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

In other words, an attack on any of us in any part of the world defined by the treaty is deemed to be an attack on all. This was within the contemplation of the arrangement made.

Then article 3 of the treaty, and I refer particularly to article 3 which sets up in general the organization that prevails under NATO, provides:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Then I would ask the house to take a look at chart No. 4 in the last issue of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization report, which sets out in detail the organization. I have had the chart enlarged, so it is apparent. The North Atlantic council is at the head of what I might call the pyramid. Under it there is the military committee. The military committee is divided into two parts, the military committee in permanent session and the standing group. This again is divided into the various organizations that actually constitute the effective part of NATO, into the supreme allied commander Europe, the supreme allied commander Atlantic, and the Canada-United States regional planning group. In other words, these three elements stem from the military committee.

Then in so far as the supreme allied commander, Europe, is concerned, he has under his authority the commander in chief, allied forces, northern Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, central Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, southern Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, Mediterranean. The supreme allied commander in the Atlantic has under him the commander in chief western Atlantic; the commander of the striking fleet, Atlantic; the commander in chief,