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the need for exercising greater care and for applying more stringent controls in the use of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear-fuel cycle. Canada will continue to press in its bilateral nuclear relations and in all appropriate forums for the further strengthening and broadening of the scope of nuclear safeguards. In our view, safeguards will not be fully effective until they cover all peaceful nuclear activities in all states. As a country that has willingly accepted the application of safeguards to all of its own nuclear industry, Canada firmly believes that universal acceptance of such safeguards would provide the soundest basis for international nuclear co-operation.

The NPT Review Conference called for intensified study of the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It strongly reaffirmed the provisions of Article V of the Treaty whereby any potential benefits from the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, under appropriate international observation and procedures, through an appropriate international body and pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements. It confirmed that any such benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty by way of nuclear-explosive services provided by nuclear-weapon states and conducted under the appropriate international observation and procedures called for in Article V. It concluded that the IAEA was the international body through which potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states.

Canada fully supported these conclusions. Nonetheless, we remain to be convinced that there are significant potential benefits in so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. We doubt that any benefits that may exist would outweigh the inherent risks. Certainly there can be no question that such explosions would have crucial arms-control implications. It has been clearly recognized in resolutions of this Assembly in 1974 and 1975 that no distinction can be made between the technology for nuclear weapons and for nuclear-explosive devices for peaceful purposes and that it is not possible to develop such devices for peaceful application without at the same time acquiring nuclear-weapons capability. It is for this reason that we are participating fully in the detailed study being conducted in the IAEA of the economic, technical, safety, environmental and legal aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. The IAEA studies will require more time, but we hope they will lead not only to broad consensus on the economic, technical and legal aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions

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