

the principle of negotiation." We recognized, however, that while summit meetings are desirable if they offer prospects of reaching settlements on important questions, they are not the only way - or necessarily the best way - of conducting negotiations or of reducing international tension. A summit meeting could only be helpful if it were thoroughly prepared and if the atmosphere was right. Far better, in the absence of a proper atmosphere, to continue the patient probing, the diplomatic pick and shovel work so necessary to the achievement of results in international negotiations.

At the Copenhagen Meeting, I suggested that a forthcoming summit meeting might be regarded as one of a series of such meetings. It would not be the first but the second of a series of meetings of Heads of Government, since that held in Geneva in 1955 should be considered the first. This approach would recognize that there are a number of important and complicated problems between East and West which we cannot hope to settle satisfactorily at one meeting and that they called for a continuous process of high-level discussion and negotiation. In this way public opinion would not be misled into thinking that a single meeting at the summit will solve all the outstanding issues between East and West. If we follow this concept of a series of such meetings, then the next one, for which we are now preparing, could have a limited agenda and limited objectives without conveying the impression to the public at large that issues not considered at this meeting were not a proper subject for negotiation between East and West. Such matters would simply be deferred until a subsequent meeting and, if there were an increase in mutual confidence and understanding, there would be better prospects for agreement being reached at such a subsequent meeting or meetings.

Disarmament

You will, I hope, agree that the position which the NATO allies have taken in respect of a summit meeting reflects a real desire for progress. The same is true, I am convinced, with regard to the talks which were held at Copenhagen on the question of disarmament. You will recall that in August 1957 Canada joined with its principal allies in submitting a comprehensive set of disarmament proposals for consideration by the Soviet Union. These proposals met with a most disappointing response. The Soviet Union refused to accept them as a basis for discussion.

There followed a long and often frustrating period of several months during which both in the United Nations and in exchanges of letters with the Soviet Government the Western countries earnestly sought to find some way in which disarmament discussions could be resumed. The Soviet authorities found various procedural reasons why the resumption of negotiations on disarmament might better be deferred until a summit conference had been convened. We refused to accept a stalemate on these terms.