

2. Explanations

Depending on the nature of the plants involved, different methods and procedures are needed for effective verification by the committee. The procedures to be permitted are not intended as alternatives but are to supplement one another, as required. The details will be established in collaboration with the appropriate national authority. The determining criteria will be concentration on the information actually needed and cost-effectiveness as regards equipment and manpower. In order to establish the absence of certain substances without simultaneously ascertaining the actual composition of the sample, merely toxicological tests or the determination of functional groups of chemical compounds are necessary. This ensures that production secrets are not revealed by the regular checks.

(iv)

1. Special checks

Every Contracting Party is entitled, if it has concrete grounds for suspecting that another party is violating the convention, to demand a special check by the committee. Such a check serves to establish the facts, if necessary by means of an on-site inspection by the committee. The findings must be set out in a report. If the matter cannot be clarified satisfactorily in this manner or if the State affected refuses verification without giving good reasons, every Contracting State is entitled to appeal to the United Nations. It may also withdraw from the convention in accordance with its provisions.

2. Explanations

Special checks are a necessary supplement of regular checks. The scope of a special check will therefore be determined by the nature and substance of the suspicion and by the degree of mutual co-operation in clarifying the matter; it cannot therefore be defined in detail. Its success is dependent on a party agreeing to the demanded clarification and making the necessary declaration. It pre-supposes a large degree of willingness to co-operate. As a result of the regular checks described in this paper, the occasion on which special checks become necessary will, incidentally, be few in number.

C. Concluding Remarks

This paper presents a verification arrangement which must form an integral part of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons. The paper is therefore intended to contribute towards reaching agreement on the minimum security requirements that have to be met and on how to secure maximum confidence in the convention being complied with.

The arrangement described above is acceptable, effective and necessary.

It is acceptable because

- it is non-discriminatory,
- it is confined to the most important and most hazardous types of chemical weapons,
- it necessitates relatively limited manpower and expenditure, and
- it ensures that production secrets are not revealed.