

blockade his coasts. A blockade, however, except when favored by exceptional geographical conditions, is a very difficult operation, and it cannot be attempted without a great superiority of naval force. The blockading force, moreover, is neutralized, and is not available for other operations. Further, a blockade is too slow in producing an effect to satisfy the conditions of modern war. It has also the serious disadvantage that it injures neutrals as much, or almost as much, as the enemy, and it thus excites a strong feeling of animosity against the nation which adopts such a plan. (5) We could bombard or extort indemnities from an enemy's undefended ports. If, however, we examine the map, we shall find that our opportunities in this respect are very limited, whilst we ourselves offer to a naval power an almost incredible number of unprotected points of great commercial importance. (6) We could attack and destroy his coast fortifications. This, indeed, might be done, but the attack of sea-ports is at best a costly operation, and the result, in this day of torpedoes and submarine mines, must always be very uncertain.

Our powers of injuring an enemy by naval means alone are, indeed, very limited, and it is impossible to see how in this way we could force him to yield to terms disadvantageous to himself. It is, in fact, very doubtful whether, with all our naval superiority, we should not suffer in a war with a naval power more than the enemy. Contemporary history gives ample proof of the impossibility of achieving great results by sea. In the Crimean war how much did the superiority of the allied fleets contribute to the treaty of 1856? In the American war of secession the conditions were exceptionally favorable for the employment of naval forces. The federal party had an overwhelming superiority at sea, and yet their navy contributed comparatively little to the subjection of the Confederates, except in so far as it acted in co-operation with the land armies. The achievements of the Austrian fleet in 1866, of the French in 1870, and of the Turks in 1887, had absolutely no effect upon the issue of these wars.

On the other hand, the superiority at sea, backed by an efficient land force, places an insular power such as Great Britain, in a position of extraordinary advantage. It enables us, while resting secure from invasion, to attack an enemy in his own territory, and thus inflict upon him all the hardships and loss of war. There is with us, of course, no question of marching upon Paris, Berlin or St. Petersburg; that, from the nature of our circumstances, is not to be thought of. Supposing, however, that we were possessed of an efficient army, we could, if forced into war with a European power, and acting with an ally, despatch a force which would have an important influence upon the result of a campaign, not only on account of its actual strength, but also because, assisted by a fleet, it would enable us to shift our base according as the coast-line offered facilities, and so to put the enemy to considerable disadvantage. If acting without allies, we could land troops on the extremities of the enemy's territory and move them from point to point by sea. By threatening an invasion at different points, we could keep a relatively large force employed in watching our movements, and if an enemy had reason to fear anything from another European power he would be placed in a position of great perplexity. But out of the continent of Europe we should be irresistible, especially against European powers, whose possessions would be at our mercy. In fact, to an insular power with a superior navy an efficient army is indispensable. It is the complement of the naval force, the barbed head to the spear. The very essence of the advantage of our naval superiority is the power to despatch troops into an enemy's territory without the risk of being invaded ourselves. Without an army this advantage is taken from us; and an enemy has this strong inducement to make war upon us that, however much he may attack us, his own possessions are secure from molestation.

But there are some wars which it is our duty to be prepared for, which would necessarily involve us in military operations by land on a more or less extensive scale. Of such the most threatening is the case of an invasion of India by Russia, or of a war with Russia in Afghanistan. If any one sits down calmly, and counts the cost of such an undertaking—considering first the force which would undoubtedly be collected at a base of operations at no great distance from our frontiers, connected by rail with Europe, and, secondly the measures which must be taken to defeat the attempt—I venture to say that he cannot escape the conclusion that a force of no less than 200,000 men must be put into the field, in addition to the troops required to preserve order in the interior of the country. It will be incumbent upon us in such a case not only to have a strong army to guard the threatened frontier, but to concentrate also a still stronger force to operate beyond our borders, and to strike at the enemy's possessions; or his line of advance. Standing by itself, this question is sufficient to impose upon us the necessity of being a military power. It is only as a military power that we can hold India. If these views are placed side by side with those of foreign writers, it will be seen that they are on the side of economy, not on that of prudence.

Second in importance comes the question of a war between Canada and the United States. Happily such a war is in the present state of our relations with the States, a most unlikely contingency; nevertheless, it cannot be left altogether out of account. It is hardly possible to over-estimate the force we should require to guard such an immense frontier-line as that between Canada and the States, and to meet the forces which would be deployed against us.

Thirdly may be mentioned the case of a war in Egypt with a Mediterranean power, or with Turkey, when we were not able to prevent the transport of troops into Egypt; or, possibly when, at the commencement of hostilities, the troops of a foreign power were occupying Egypt, as in 1801. It is needless to say that such a war would tax our military resources to the utmost. As, however, the question of Egypt is intimately connected with that of Constantinople, which by hypothesis is excluded from the present discussion, too much importance need not be attached to it here.

Next comes the case of an invasion of Holland or Belgium by a continental power. In such a case we should be called upon to meet the military nations of the continent in their own element, and this would demand from us a combined naval and military operation on the largest scale.

Such contingencies, also, as wars in South Africa, with the Transvaal and Orange Free State; in China, as in 1860; in Persia, as in 1857; in South or Central America, or New Zealand, must be taken into consideration. These wars might not strain our resources as to numbers, to the utmost, but they would impose upon us the necessity of despatching to the most distant parts of the world, and of maintaining in the field for some time, forces of considerable strength, and in case of complications with other nations we should be seriously weakened.

Last to be mentioned is the case of an invasion of Great Britain. If this should ever be attempted, and, an enemy's army should ever actually reach our shores, the only thing, under present conditions, which could stand between us and annihilation is a powerful field force.

In considering these cases of wars which may possibly be forced upon us, each case has been taken singly. It is hardly necessary to add that there is no reason in the world that they should come singly, if they come at all. We may be attacked by a combination of enemies, or we may have to despatch expeditions to operate against enemies in different parts of the world at the same time. Of such operations we have had, in recent years, plenty of experience. In 1879-80 we had expeditionary forces in Afghanistan and South Africa; while in 1884-85, we had on hand, at one time, campaigns in Egypt, South Africa and Canada, and at the same time were on the very verge of war with Russia. It is most probable, indeed, that if a great power wished to attack us, it would select a moment when we were engaged with enemies far away from home.

If these cases be considered on their merits, it is hard to see what ground there can be for the allegation that we need no longer attempt to be a military power. The bond which unites the different parts of an empire or commonwealth is the obligation to unite in the defence of the interests of each part against aggression. The secret of Imperial federation is the adoption of a means of applying the united power of the empire to promote the interests of each colony. It is, indeed, impossible for us to inaugurate our union with the colonies by divesting ourselves of the responsibilities and sacrifices which devolve upon an empire. Such a course would inevitably lead to separation and disintegration.

But some qualification for these deductions may be sought for from the definition of the term "military power." What sort of a military power is it incumbent upon us to be? It may be conceded at once that we cannot be a military power in the sense that the term is understood on the Continent of Europe, nor is there any necessity that we should attempt it. Our interests lie beyond the Continent of Europe, in the main, although, it is well to bear in mind, it may be necessary for us to defend our non-European interests in Europe. We must, however, be able to defend any of our possessions against invasion, and we must have a pointed head to the spear of our naval supremacy. If we take as the minimum of our requirements the conditions that our possessions must be secure from attack by land, we shall probably find that this will cover the other condition of providing us with a sufficiently powerful force to take full advantage of our naval supremacy, and to intervene with an ally in Europe in case our interests should require it. If these conditions are fulfilled, we shall undoubtedly be entitled to call ourselves a military power.

[To be continued.]

### Regimental Intelligence.

A handsome monument to the memory of the late Colonel Mackeand, bearing the 90th coat of arms, and the swordbelt, etc., of an officer, has been erected in St. John's cemetery, Winnipeg, near the graves of the volunteers.

The anniversary of the relief of Lucknow was celebrated at Toronto on Sunday, by the veterans residing in that city, by attendance at service at St. Andrew's Church, where the preacher was Rev. G. M. Milligan the pastor. About thirty veterans were present.

The non-com. officers of C company, R.S.I., held their annual supper in the sergeants' mess on Friday evening last. In the absence of Sergt.-Major Munroe the chair was ably filled by Quartermaster Sergt. Swanson. Lt.-Cols. Otter and Alger and the officers of C Company were present as guests. Among the many toasts proposed were "The Commandant and Officers of C Co., R. S. I." responded to by Lt.-Col. Otter and Lieut. Wadmore. Col. Otter eulogised the n.c.o. for their zeal and good conduct, and complimented them upon the excellence of their mess establishment, which he believed was second to none in Canada. Lieut. Wadmore reminded those present of the absence of their late captain, Lt.-Col. Smith, whose loss all deplored. In response to the toast of the "Sergeants' Mess," Quartermaster-Sergt. Swanson stated that the mess was entirely free from debt, and that \$1,800 had already been spent in improvements to the premises.

One of the most successful social events in Montreal for some time past was the "at home" given by the officers of the local militia on Friday evening last, in the Victoria rifles' armory, in honor of the officers of H.M.S. Tourmaline, who attended in a body. Six hundred invitations had been issued, and more than half the number invited were present. The ball was opened by a quadrille participated in by the following: Capt. Byles (Tourmaline) and Mrs. Frank Bond; ex-Mayor Beaugrand and Mrs. Caverhill, Lieut. Walker, R.N., and Mrs. Beaugrand; Lt.-Col. Oswald and Mrs. McShane; Lt.-Col. Bond and Mrs. Warrington; Lt.-Col. Caverhill and Mrs. McDougall; Lt.-Col. Massey and Miss McPherson; Lt.-Col. Henshaw and Mrs. Crawford; Lt.-Col. Stevenson and Mrs. Schwob; Mr. H. V. Meredith and Mrs. Massey.