

ceeding monarchs, these were considered as unnecessary formalities, and rejected. They, then, enacted laws in their own names, and alone—the style of persuasion, which was used in the earlier edicts, was changed for the imperative declaration of an absolute Legislator, “*voulons, commandons et ordonnons, car tel est notre plaisir*,” and for the deliberative voice of the council, was substituted the practice of verifying and enregistering the royal ordinances in the Parliaments or Sovereign Courts of those Jurisdictions to which the King thought proper to extend them; a practice which was continued, without deviation, until it became a fundamental maxim in French Jurisprudence, recognised, equally, by the Prince and by the People, that no Law could be published in any other manner, and that no ordinance could have any effect, or bind the inhabitants of any particular Jurisdiction, before it was verified and enregistered, by the King’s order, in the Sovereign tribunal of that Jurisdiction. (1) Under the sanction of this maxim, the Parliaments of France, at various times, refused to verify and enregister particular ordinances, which they conceived to be oppressive to the subject, or subversive of the constitution, with a spirit and constancy which reflected the highest honor on their members, but bore no proportion to the power which they opposed.—In some instances of their opposition, the King voluntarily abandoned the obnoxious Law; in others, the Parliament, on their part, thought it most prudent to submit, and obeyed the royal commands, contenting themselves with an entry, purporting that the enregistry was made by compulsion, “*ex iterativo et expresse mandato Regis*.” (2) But, whenever instances have occurred in which the Parliaments have inflexibly refused to enregister an ordinance which the King had determined to carry into execution, the plenitude of the royal power has afforded a remedy for their refusal. Upon such occasions, the King repaired, in person, to the Parliament and held a “*lit de Justice*.” He took possession of that seat, which he was supposed at all times to occupy, and commanded the ordinance to be read, verified and registered in his presence—for, being the Sovereign, and personally present, the Parliament was held then to have no authority, according to the principle, *adveniente principe, cessat Magistratus*, a principle which the constitution of France seems to have recognized, and which most effectually defeated every effort of her Parliaments to limit and control the Crown, in the exercise of a supreme legislative authority. (3)

“*Ordonnance*,” is a generic term, comprehending, in its most extensive application, every rule of conduct prescribed by the Sovereign to his subjects *in person*, as the Royal Edicts, Declarations, and *Arrêts du Roi en son Conseil*, or by his authority, as the bye-laws of

(1) *Rocheblavin des Parlemens de France*, liv. 13, cap. 17, No. 3, p. 702. *Pasquier*, troisième Note, tit. de la clause “*car ainsi me plaît*,” p. 334 and 336—*Pasquier*, *Recherches de la France*, lib. cap. 4—*Loyseau des Seigneuries*, cap. 3 No 11.—*Des Offices*, lib 4, cap 5, No 67.—*Coquille Inst. au Droit François*, cap 1st.—*Héricourt, Loix Ecclesiastiques*, p 108, cap 16, sec 10—*Maximes du Droit Public François*, vol 4, p 57.

(2) *Maximes du Droit Public François*, vol 4, p 240 & sec 1 q.

(3) *Rocheblavin*, p 928 & 929—*Pasquier's Recherches*, vol 2, p 576, 577, [and 1st, p 61—*Répert* “*Lit de Justice*,” vol 36, p 529.