consorts under their marriage contract, could be thus overthrown by an incidental legislation I cannot conceive. The framers of the Confederation Act never intended to give unlimited jurisdiction to the Parliament of Canada on marriage or divorce so as to encroach upon the liberties and privileges guaranteed to the inhabitants of this country by former treaties. My opinion, judging from the stand-point of my religious convictions, is that divorce, in so far as the Catholic consorts are concerned, is a complete nullity and is not binding, the existing laws in Lower Canada acknowledging in plain terms the principles of marriage indissolubility. Whether Protestants are bound to the same extent is a matter of very serious consideration. Clauses 91 and 92 of the Constitutional Act are conflicting on the subject. According to the best authorities on the question, divorce cannot be enforced in any of the provinces of our Dominion of Canada, except where said divorce is not repugnant to former treaties or civil laws in existence at the time the Confederation Act was passed. It is asserted that even Protestant divorced consorts entering into a second marriage, when the first one has not yet been dissolved by the natural death of one of the parties, are, especially in Lower Canada, deprived of certain rights or civil status, which they have enjoyed under ordinary circumstances, through their marriage contract. But, at all events, it is wise and sound policy, in a mixed community like ours, not to disregard the rules and dictates of the different Churches, in order to find out the intention of the lawmakers and the correct interpretation to be placed upon the above clauses of our constitution.

The correspondent had evidently in view those differences of legislation and the predominant influence of religious feeling in the Parliament of Canada when he proposed the creation of a Divorce Court for the whole Dominion. By that plan, the judicial power would replace the legislative authority, or rather would have a concurrent jurisdiction. The suggestion is made as a means to do away with the costly procedure of parliamentary machinery, and to adopt a simple and cheap system whereby both rich and poor could obtain equal justice, if necessary.

The proposed change would be far more dangerous than the existing state of things. "M. M." has cited facts and furnished data showing the evils caused by divorce laws in many countries of the civilized world. Why should we open the door to still greater abuses, and give depraved or unhappy consorts facilities which they are now refused by our present constitution? I fail to see the wisdom of such a policy. To pretend that in leaving to Parliament alone the right of granting divorce is "to bow the knee to an *imperium in imperio* and an abnegation of "British right and self-respect," is going a little too far. One might be a free and loyal subject of Her Majesty, and consider that national dignity and individual liberty do not require more than an institution like the eminent body of our Canadian legislators in order to solve those difficult problems. I would be pleased if our Parliament in its quasi-judicial authority could adopt more stringent rules in enquiring and adjudicating upon all divorce matters. We cannot point to a single instance in the history of British institutions, or of any other civilized countries, where the promulgation of laws of divorce, and the creation of special courts to enforce them, have been productive of any good and beneficial result to religious and social order. This assertion is a little at variance with the opinions of eminent statesmen and writers cited in the article impugned; still, I feel it my duty to declare my sentiment boldly and courageously. The example of the Imperial Parliament of England, cited by Mr. Gemmill's critic, only goes to show that in saddling a Court of Divorce with this question Parliament wanted to get rid of a very serious responsibility. Consequently I cannot but deplore the following lines in the article under discussion: "The doors of a Divorce Court may be open to all, and yet no one can be obliged to resort to it against his will. If in fault against one entitled to such remedy and using it, that is the penalty of his or her own sin; no sacrament can cover civic crime."

What is the meaning of such an argument? It means that divorce is the only remedy against domestic infelicity or the criminal excesses of consorts. Does the correspondent