

thus adapted both to the childhood of the world and to all those who are weary of intellectual effort. These may be good reasons where all hope of arriving at objective truth is renounced; they could scarcely be admitted under any other circumstances. That there is any greater intrinsic dignity or nobility in a universe created by design than in one created by evolution, few men with scientific habits of thought will probably be able to admit. These qualities are not objective, but subjective. They do not belong to the world, but to those who contemplate it, and thus so much of the supposed speculative interest is relegated to the class of practical interest.

The empiricist of Kant loses all of these advantages. In embracing the antithesis, he removes the foundations of religion and morality, the latter conceived as deriving all its sanctions from authority. "If there is no primordial Being (*Urwesen*) distinct from the universe; if the universe is without a beginning, and therefore without a creator, our will not free, and the soul of the same divisibility and perishability as matter, moral ideas and principles lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas which formed their theoretical support." In this passage he evidently fails to distinguish the fine shades, on the strength of which many modern scientists so stoutly reject the charge of materialism; yet he has clearly in view the stern mechanical connection between phenomena which constitutes the basis of the causational philosophy of science.

To those who would disdain material things as unworthy, it has been well replied that "we know no more essentially what matter is than what mind is" (Dr. Henry Maudsley, *Fort. Rev.*, Aug., 1879, p. 249). It may be added that, so far as the mind or soul is concerned, there are two widely different classes of materialists, whose views are perhaps more completely distinct than those of either are from those of avowed spiritualists. The one class regard the soul, or mind, as a material substance, differing from other material things only as these differ from one another. Or, if they deny that this spiritual entity is just the kind of matter of which the visible objects around us are composed, they still maintain its materiality as constituting it a substance independent of other substances—a real thing.

The other class, who have also been called materialists, do not regard the mind, or spirit, as in itself anything at all. They maintain that it is simply a property of a certain specialized kind of matter,—a mode of manifestation possessed by that organized substance called brain, or nerve-substance. Nothing could be more *immaterial* than this conception of mind, while in purity and delicacy it certainly occupies a much higher rank than either the idea of actual materiality, already described, or that of spirituality, whatever that term may mean, which also attributes to it identity and independence.

IV.

EMPIRICISM, thus defined, is not, however, entirely without its advantages. It, too, possesses a certain speculative interest, in defining which Kant still more clearly shows that he was contemplating that same universal antithesis in the human mind which