

whether or not the U.S.S.R. means to go to war or whether, if it does so, the war will be a nuclear one. This debate on the question of what should be done in respect of defence is taking place not only in Canada, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the free countries in Europe but everywhere in the world. The United States has been following a course which is based on the fact that if war comes it will be a cataclysmic nuclear war, the result being that ground forces and conventional weapons will take second place.

Defence policy cannot be certain. If it could be certain, and if we could determine today the course for the next three or four year, great savings might be made. . . . If we could anticipate what the U.S.S.R. would do, naturally we would be able to look into the future as to the course that should be followed with the same clarity that all of us can look into the past.

The attitude of the Canadian Government and its stand on defence was clearly set forth in detail in the Defence White Paper in April 1959. That Canadian defence policy derives directly from our foreign policy and is designed to ensure national security and the preservation of world peace. These objectives are reached through collective arrangements within NATO and the United Nations. It is the defence policy of Canada to provide forces for defence against an attack on the North American continent; the collective defence and deterrent forces of NATO in Europe and the North Atlantic; and to support the United Nations in attaining its peaceful aims.

Then there is set out in detail the course to be followed. It is stated that the knowledge that an act of aggression would in all likelihood occur with little or no warning requires that Canadian defence forces be at the maximum state of readiness. The course to be followed is there set out in detail and it deals with the attitude of the Canadian Government based on the best information that we could secure. In this White Paper, it is stated that it is now considered that the threat of the manned bomber is not as great as was originally anticipated and that, furthermore, by 1962, when the CF-105 would have come into operational use in the RCAF, the main threat is expected to consist of long-range missiles rather than manned bombers.

Those were the words in the White Paper of April 1959. Those are words that have been borne out in the declaration made two days ago by Mr. Khrushchov. As I said a moment ago, our defence policy is for the purpose of contributing to the maintenance of peace. We know that there will be no victor in the next war. Gone are the days when a nation could consider war as a means of enforcing a certain policy and of furthering its political aims. The whole purpose of armed forces today and of defence expenditure is to create a state of preparedness which would enable a country under the imminent threat of all-out nuclear attack to retaliate with a knock-out blow of equal force or at least of sufficient force to meet the aggressor.

In other words, our policy has been one of collective defence. Aware as we are of the changing concept of defence in this age of thermonuclear weapons,