

those members of congress, Porter, Williams, Cheeves and Widgery, who have promised us the immediate possession of *these provinces*, tell us *we are in danger from them?*

But, above all, Mr. Madison is precluded from the apology, because he has sent three distinct armies to invade Canada—and *we have a right* to presume he authorized their commanders to issue the proclamations which they have done, in which they speak with contempt of the enemy's force and power, and of the ease with which the conquest can be effected, a language very disgraceful to our nation, if the prospect of success had not been nearly certain. Besides, Mr. Madison by refusing Sir George Prevost's proposition for an armistice, proved he had no fears of an invasion.

Mr. Madison it appears, then, could not have feared an invasion by sea, because Great-Britain had no *knowledge of the war*—because she liberated American property—repealed her orders in council, and was making a new embassy for peace. It appears, also, that he had no fears for the sea board, for he ordered away all the troops for the invasion of Canada. It is equally clear that he did not fear an invasion by land, because he was both making and preparing an invasion of Canada, and he knew Great-Britain had not a force even competent for *defence*.

Yet, in face of the clear sense and spirit of the constitution, he ordered out the militia. This we call an usurpation; but the manner of doing it we consider a pettifogging quibble. In the first application to all the eastern governours, it was not stated that there was an "invasion" to be repelled, or an *imminent danger of one*, but when the governours hesitated on this ground, they were artfully told, that the danger of invasion had *increased* since his first demand—but as there was *no danger at first*, it still did not follow that there was *much* at the last application. In fact, Mr. Madison knew there *was none*. The real design, we shall show in our next.

NO. XVI.

THE QUESTION OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION, CONCLUDED.

We have shewn, that the right of judging whether the cases in which the militia can be ordered out, exist, is vested, from the very nature of the limitation, in the governours of the several states; and we have proved, that even if this right existed in the president, it has been, in the late cases, very unjustly exercised. We shall now say something more on this subject, before we consider the remedy for such an abuse, and the evil consequences which may follow from this abuse, if not duly restrained.

When the secretary at war, and the president, were very properly pushed by the executives of the northern states, to state, precisely, the nature and extent of the danger of *invasion*, they replied, that war having been commenced, there resulted from the *very*