

same felon repents and having made his peace with God, the circumstance which had formerly rendered him unhappy is removed, and he has once more the power of enjoyment. In this instance had any other feeling than the fear of retribution been the occasion of his misery, repentance could never have affected its removal. It could not have been a benevolent feeling for the person injured, for the most Quixotic admirers of "complicated and abstruse" philosophy would scarcely like the idea of admitting that repentance was incompatible with benevolence. The motives of action in all these cases, instead of being irreconcilable with the theory which I have proposed, afford perhaps as good illustrations of its truth as any that could be advanced.

In another passage our author affords the strongest evidence that he has assumed his title on the "*lucus a non lucendo*" principle. "Self regard is not a more universal principle than benevolence. The man, therefore, who asserts that self love is the sole origin of action, takes but a narrow and pitiful view of human nature." In this quotation we are at a loss which most to admire, the *sentiment* or the *logic*. One would have supposed, that a person with the definition of reasoning at his finger ends, should have possessed sufficient acquaintance with the nature of a syllogism, to be aware of what premises are necessary to a conclusion. We wonder how he should like to subscribe to a deduction made upon the same principle. "Mr. Sophos, there is not an arranter wise-acre than yourself in existence. The man, therefore, who asserts that you are any thing else takes a narrow and pitiful view of what he owes to truth." Whenever our author will consent to the validity of this conclusion, we shall coincide with the doctrines which he attempts to maintain.

It is not impossible however, that we have misapprehended what he intended for premises, and that this conclusion from a *petitio principii*, was designed for a mere side shot or corollary from the other, and peradventure the feelings which decorate the effusion ushered in by these sentences, are intended as apologies for this purpose. If this conjecture be correct, we are still unable to ascertain whether it is the first or second part of his syllogism which they are intended to prove. But we remember in our youthful days to have snatched a dusty volume of Watt from an inglorious repose in an old library, and to have particularly noted a remark to this effect. "The conclusion can never be stronger than the weakest of the premises." It is therefore immaterial at what part of the passage we commence, for the demolition of either conclusion or premises will destroy the whole fabric. We shall therefore reduce the ideas contained in his list of interrogations, to feelings not originating in a sense of duty and experienced from circumstances that do not affect us as individuals, and proceed to inquire the source in which they originate.