

conceive their Interest requires the Operation.

As the unexpected Conquest of *Cape-Breton* raised the Reputation of the *British* Naval Force beyond what it had been during the then and present Administration, it was natural for the Ministry and their Friends to enhance its Importance, not because they really thought it of Importance, but because the Belief of it contributed to exalt their own Reputations, and to create an Opinion in the Publick, that there was an Intention to pursue *British* Measures only, in the future Operations of the War, which had been 'till then, too visibly pursued on on a different Principle. But what was thus propagated only to amuse the Publick, was not only swallowed, but digested by the Populace, who seldom examine the Truth of any Assertion, or the Rectitude of any Measure, if the Pill be but gilt with Speciousness and Plausibility.

Thus came *Cape-Breton* to be thought of so great Consequence, that for a time, I don't know whether it might not have been safer for the Ministry to cede the *Isle of Wight* to *France*, than yield up that of *Cape-Breton*; so dangerous it is to instil vague and false Notions in the Minds of an undiscerning