

*The Address—Mr. Kaplan*

On the other hand, if the Meech Lake Accord does not go through, he has an obvious scapegoat and he has already begun defining and building the scapegoat. The scapegoat is that group that his American friends refer to as the "L word", the Liberals. Surely he will not be able to include the Leader of the Opposition in the scapegoat, although he did so during the election campaign and repented on his first few days back in Parliament. The Leader of the Official Opposition (Mr. Turner) has gone to the limit to defend the Meech Lake Accord and support it, to try to see to its constitutionalization. However, there are other Liberals around the country, whose names the Prime Minister is already collecting on some list, to be the villains along with others who oppose the Meech Lake Accord, to blame as the reason why it did not go through. As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, candour and consistency are not his strong points.

This approach I have taken to understanding the Meech Lake Accord applies equally to the view from Québec City. Either the deal will go through or it will not, as I have said. If it goes through, Mr. Bourassa will have proof that a federalist Government of a province can achieve more than a separatist Government; that he was able, when René Lévesque was not, to go through this constitutional stage and successfully negotiate the five point agenda which he brought forward to persuade the country that these five points were important and were adopted by the nation. I would also say that if the Meech Lake Accord goes through, in some ways that I will explain later, Québec would be more comfortable within Canada.

On the other hand, if the Accord does not go through—and from what I have learned, Mr. Bourassa is making no effort to see that it does go through—he, like the Prime Minister, has a ready scapegoat. His scapegoat is one that has been available to some Québécois for generations, for decades. That is, the rest of Canada. They can look to the rest of Canada and I regret to say that they will not have difficulty finding some statements, like those made at the hearings being held in Manitoba and elsewhere, to the effect that French is un-Canadian, that there should be no initiatives taken or efforts made to promote the use of French in the country. There are statements like that and I know my friend will recognize that they are not being made by Liberals, as I gather they are not being made by federal Conservatives. But they exist and Mr. Bourassa will be able to refer to them to explain why the Constitution went down.

There are Canadians providing the text for him to the effect that the fundamental contract and understanding by which French and English were to be preserved, was the basis for the establishment of Canada and must be the basis for its continuation. Mr. Bourassa will be able to beat the jungle drum about the need for stronger government in the Province of Québec, the need for stronger measures like Bill 178, a Bill which, by its own admission and in its terms, violates the rights of English speakers within the Province of Québec and violates the Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and I think we will soon see that it violates as well the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Fortunately, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights has no notwithstanding clause. We may reach a point sometime soon at which the Government of Québec must deal with that. But the point I wish to make now is that a failed Meech Lake is not without some convenience to Québec City and not without some convenience to the Prime Minister.

• (1330)

As our Party's spokesman for Meech Lake over the past four years, I can assure the House I am a keen observer of the Accord and I have thought about it a lot. It seems, in a certain sense, to be a mirage. It looks like an agreement, but the more you examine it the more you find it is full of intentional ambiguities.

I want to say a word about intentional ambiguities. We attempted, as others did across the country, to clarify the ambiguities, to make amendments to make it more clear. But I do not wish to dismiss the concept of the intentional ambiguity. I remember, before my time here, when the International Monetary Fund was established, I heard Louis Rasminsky, who was our representative at Bretton Woods when that was done, observing that one of the great achievements of the establishment of the IMF was that the document establishing it had no unintentional ambiguities. In other words, it had ambiguities but none of them were unintentional.

When a lawyer acts for a client, he does not want ambiguities, intentional or unintentional. You want to be able to tell your client in any situation exactly what his or her rights will be. To do less than that as a lawyer is to fail your client.

In building a constitution for the IMF, to use my example, or for a nation, intentional ambiguities are often desirable. They permit an agreement to be signed. Basically, the parties are saying, I have my interpretation of what this means. You have your interpretation. Eventually it will be settled, but we can live with the ambiguities in the meanwhile. We are ready in the