good reason to believe that interception would result in conviction.

The arrangements concerning the issuance of warrants to security services are similar to those relating to the criminal end of things but the objectives of the security services are quite different. In England the principles governing the issuing of warrants to the security services can be cited in the following terms: there must be a major subversive or espionage activity which is likely to injure the national interest and, further, the material likely to be obtained by interception must be of direct use in compiling the information necessary to the security services in carrying out the tasks laid upon it by the state.

The committee of the Privy Council to which I have referred made two very important recommendations which should commend themselves to the Solicitor General (Mr. Blais) in the absence of any provisions in the bill before us similar to those in the British legislation and apparently to those in the United States legislation as well. The recommendation of the Council is found in paragraph 74 of the report and is as follows:

● (2012)

We feel that the outstanding warrants should be reviewed more frequently. We therefore recommend that there should be a regular review not less than once a month both by the Home Office—

In this case that would be the office of the Solicitor General.

—and by every authority that is granted a warrant to intercept. This review should be not only of the numbers of warrants outstanding, but of each particular warrant.

This is the kind of safeguard which the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Baldwin), myself and other members on this side are very sensitive about. They also recommended in paragraph 75 of their report that warrants should no longer be valid until they are cancelled but that their validity should be for a defined period that appears on their face. Normally this should be for a period of no longer than a month and in no case should it be for a period of longer than two months. If an extension of the validity of a warrant is desired, the reason for this should be sent to the home office for its consideration before any extension is approved.

I draw the attention of the Solicitor General to the fact that this kind of review process is well entrenched in the United States legislation which requires submission of every judicial submission to the joint committee of the Senate and House of Representatives.

The report of the special committee of Privy Councillors dealt with two other rather important features of interception legislation. One concerned itself with the use of intercepted information in the civil courts, and I notice a provision in the bill which is before us, section 178.31, where intercepted communications are admissible as evidence in any criminal proceeding which may be taken against any person. That, as I understand the bulk of United States judicial decisions, is not possible there, and that is specifically provided for in the British legislation. In paragraph 101 of their report the privy councillors who formed a special committee decided, and I quote:

We therefore conclude by recommending that there should be no disclosure of the information obtained on public grounds by the exercise of this great power, to private individuals or private bodies or domestic tribunals of any kind whatsoever.

They went on in paragraph 113 to say:

As we have pointed out in paragraphs 105 and 106, the obtaining of arrests and convictions is not necessarily a major objective of the Security Service. It is therefore not possible to measure the effectiveness of interception as used by the Security Service by reference to arrests and convictions.

That has a direct bearing on the report of the Solicitor General to parliament with respect to the Protection of Privacy Act.

It is therefore not possible to measure the effectiveness of interception as used by the Security Service by reference to arrests and convictions.

So statistics do not necessarily shore up the position of the government with respect to the unobstructed facility of interception by any means. The committee went on:

The evidence we heard overwhelmingly established the following facts:—

1. There are continuous organised and dangerous efforts to spy out secrets of the State.

2. Similar organized and continuous efforts are made to spread subversion and to penetrate the apparatus of the Government and work of high security.

3. The weakest link in this highly skilled and trained chain of espionage and subversion is communication between the agents and persons concerned.

4. Methods of interception are highly effective; they are often the only effective method of countering espionage and subversion and of safeguarding the vital secrets of the State. We received a great deal of direct evidence of the success achieved solely by the interception of communications.

That committee visited a centre where telephone tapping was operated, and the committee members themselves held a telephone conversation which was tapped and recorded by a machine in their presence. There was a very small number of persons supervising that purely mechanical operation, which I do not think is the case here in our system. In paragraph 116 we find the following words:

. . . whether it is relevant to the inquiry in hand or not, whether or not it contains private and personal or even privileged conversations.

This brings us to the whole thrust of the question of the hon. member for Central Nova (Mr. MacKay) when he inquired as to the difficulties inherent in the provision for the opening of the mail of solicitors. In England, it is at the point when the recording is passed to the authorities concerned with the use of interception that the whole content of the interceptions becomes known to officials, whether or not it is relevant to the inquiry in hand, whether or not it contains private and personal or even privileged communications. I will come back to that in a moment when I speak about a matter which the Chair, I think, should be taking under consideration with respect to the matter of privilege to which I referred concerning the rights and immunities of members, and in particular the effect of this bill in so far as the opening of mails in the post offices on these premises, which are not under the jurisdiction of Mr. Speaker but of the Postmaster General (Mr. Lamontagne).

In England, the number of officials who have access to this information is small, "small" compared with the recent disclo-