

*Supply—National Defence*

understanding, knowledge and skill in their respective jobs, whether they be in electronics, aviation or captains of these ships. No matter what it is they do as most businessmen do. They spend their time keeping themselves abreast and acquainted with what is going on in their business.

With these remarks I think Halifax has now said what it can until such time as we reach the 1966-67 estimates. In most cases the money has pretty well been spent under the estimates we are discussing. I leave the minister with these three or four thoughts respecting service housing, pay, and the utilization of military airports by private and small commercial operators.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I should first like to congratulate the Minister of National Defence for what I would describe as his tactical success on the narrow front on which he has no doubt concentrated considerable effort and attention. I refer to the field of public relations. Behind the smokescreen of integration he has succeeded in concealing a conservative—I use that word as a descriptive, not a condemnatory term—sterile, and unimaginative defence policy. The vital question of the role to be played by Canadian defence forces has been virtually concealed, ignored and bypassed. The Canadian defence effort today consists of doing virtually the same old things, in the same old way, at the same old level of expenditures, namely, \$1½ billion a year.

It is interesting that in this age in which strategies as well as weapons become rapidly obsolete the minister's statement to the committee almost completely avoided any discussion of changing strategic concepts or any critical analysis whatsoever of Canada's plans for the future. No doubt the minister would reply that the strategic plans of Canada were contained in the White Paper on defence that was issued in March, 1964. But the White Paper itself was cryptic in regard to most of the major issues.

It does not appear that the government is even contemplating withdrawal from obsolete and even dangerous and provocative strategies. If it is, it is silent on the subject.

I think the public has been lulled by the minister and, indeed, I must say by the press, by the magic word "integration". In press releases which extol the bold new initiatives of the minister the public are induced to accept, with a sort of fatalistic resignation and complacency, the vast expenditures which we are making in defence.

• (2:50 p.m.)

These expenditures are more burdensome to the taxpayer than any other form of expenditure that we have to consider in this parliament. The Canadian public is asked to forget the vital question, namely, how much of the money spent might just as well be poured down the drain?

We have no objection to the limited integration which has been carried out so far. We do not believe, as the hon. member for Vancouver East said earlier in the debate, that this limited integration is responsible for the low morale of which the hon. member for Calgary North has spoken. But there will not be and there cannot be any effective integration of the Canadian forces until there is a much more realistic acceptance of the limited role which Canadian forces can be expected to play. This role in our view would be the maintenance of integrated mobile conventional forces in support of the peace keeping activities under the UN, upon which we should mainly concentrate, and a useful role within the alliance of which we are a part. This and this alone would enable real integration to take place. Without it integration is more of an incantation than it is, to borrow a phrase the Minister of Transport used in the debate the other day, the actual factual situation.

I do not propose to discuss the details of weapon systems or the acquisition of particular hardware, as we have learned to call it. I propose to review the role or tasks that Canadian forces are now fulfilling to indicate why I have suggested to the committee that some of these are obsolete and why some we are not yet adequately equipped to fulfil.

I assert that if we could penetrate the smokescreen of favourable publicity the defences of Canada under the present administration would be seen to be misdirected, expensive and inadequate. I hasten to say, Mr. Chairman, that this is in no way the fault of the men in the services. They have justly earned a high reputation for efficiency and effectiveness wherever they have served. We echo the tributes paid to them by the minister. The fault is the fault of political direction. The political direction of our armed services under the present administration is timid and traditional, fearful of a searching examination of Canada's place in over-all strategy and fearful above all of any radical change.

What are the main roles played by our armed services? They include, first, the