

- It has become generally accepted that legitimate sanctions should have the approval of the UN Security Council. At the same time, recent dissensus among Council members, along with a desire to 'download' the administrative costs of sanctions, has resulted in a more prominent role for regional organizations. Some of these organizations lack the political will, the material resources, and the administrative competence to carry out sanctions in an effective manner.
- Many states resent what they regard as the misuse of the sanctions against Iraq. Dissatisfaction with indefinite time-frames, unclear mandates, and vague conditions for lifting sanctions has created a trend in favour of more explicit, tightly circumscribed sanctions resolutions. It has also created a prejudice against comprehensive economic sanctions.
- It appears as though large-scale efforts at sanctions reform will meet with little enthusiasm, particularly from the P-5, until the sanctions against Iraq have been lifted.
- While most states support *ad hoc* efforts aimed at making sanctions more effective, many of these same states view with suspicion any 'durable' measures aimed at enhancing the institutional capacity of the U.N. to implement sanctions.

2. Strategic lessons regarding the effective and appropriate use of sanctions

- Sanctions policy must be guided by a concern with identifying measures that are both effective and humane, rather than those which seem intuitively 'strong' and politically palatable.
- The most severe sanctions do not necessarily produce proportionately large political gains for senders. Humane sanctions - those which do not threaten the survival of a large number of people - are often more likely to be effective, given the dynamics which they engender within the target state, and given their ability to gain and sustain the broad multilateral support which is essential to the success of a sanctions regime.
- This lesson must be reinforced in the minds of Security Council members. The Council should be encouraged to resist the temptation to impose sanctions on the basis of a political 'highest common denominator' - the toughest sanctions acceptable to all members.
- Senders must closely examine the structure of the target state, its economy, and its society, and design measures with a clear understanding of *who* they are intended to influence, and *how* the sanctions will cause these actors to feel pressure to change their policies.
- In designing such measures, more attention should be paid to the potentially counterproductive effects of cultural bias, propaganda, and the demands of extremist factions within the target state.
- Travel bans, visa denials, and sporting and cultural sanctions have been undervalued as means of influencing target elites.