as a subregional organization, in this case of the CSCE. The situation in the former Yugoslavia has given rise to formal arrangements between NATO and the UN with respect to certain guarantees of military support, for example, arrangements for air cover and support on an as-required basis and under rules of engagement mutually agreed. Indeed, this form of cooperation followed on the heels of a temporary arrangement entered into when the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared to be beyond the resources of the UN and at a time when it was preoccupied with Somalia. NATO, in effect, was mandated by the Security Council to run that aspect of the Yugoslav peacekeeping/humanitarian operation—and to pay for it. This latter point then led to confusion on terms of reference, command and control and a multitude of other factors that only served to reinforce the time-honoured concept of "unity of command."

This arrangement was soon terminated and UNPROFOR II, as it was called, was integrated into the overall mission in the former Yugoslavia. This particular exercise highlighted some of the pitfalls with "disjointed" operations and has augured well for the clearer definition of duties since that time between the UN, the CSCE and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), not to mention NATO. NATO continues to provide those forces for which it is uniquely suited vis-à-vis the UN, that is, the maritime and aerial surveillance and combat forces assisting in sanctions enforcement of the "no-fly zone" and, if required, the air-ground support for the relief of UN forces and other tasks. Sanctions enforcement is a major contribution to arms control in the region of the former Yugoslavia. The requisite UN resolutions are in place to authorize the use of appropriate force in support of these and other tasks.

The implementing body for NATO is the North Atlantic Council, which in turn has a full range of subordinate commands under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to actually execute tasks. The Southern European Command is executing air operations for the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia, for example.

The Western European Union. The political dimension of the NATO/Western European Union (WEU) situation is interesting but does not add much to the discussion here. Nevertheless, the WEU—another subregional organization—is co-operating with the UN (and with NATO) in the enforcement of sanctions in the former Yugoslavia, especially in the use of maritime forces as part of the blockade in the Adriatic Sea. Its role, like NATO's, is to provide military support to the UN in accordance with a Security Council granted mandate that calls upon regional organizations and arrangements to contribute, at their expense, but with UN oversight, to the overall aim.

The WEU, like NATO, has as part of its charter the concept of enforcement, and the resources to employ that force, something that not all regional/subregional organizations do.

The North Atlantic Co-operation Council. This grouping of NATO, former Warsaw Pact, former Soviet Union successor states is yet another (mostly) European-based organization whose mandate is just developing. Except for the membership of the "neutral states," the distinction between it and the CSCE, for example, has yet to be fully defined. It has the potential to temporarily fill gaps created by the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact until alternative arrangements are agreed to ensure coherent implementation of agreements entered into earlier. It is unlikely to develop any enforcement aspect, although it could assist in peacekeeping and compliance monitoring. The NACC is still evolving, and the operative aspect is now closely related to the principles of co-operation worked out under the heading "Partnership for Peace" and agreed in Brussels in January 1994. The provisions for NACC and other CSCE countries to join in UN and CSCE operations including peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations may be a precursor for future actions in the arms control and disarmament field.