

security functions which are at the centre of the UN's structure. As Alan James pointed out in his 1987 analysis, "Manifestly, the new Organization was not meant to be lacking in teeth. The absence of enforcement provisions was seen as a principal failing of its predecessor [the League Covenant]".<sup>3</sup>

However, we are finding that when this document is dusted off after 45 years and the attempt is made to make it work, the member-states have left the system incomplete, and even if they had not, its implementation is not an easy task and there is no assurance of success. The rising scale of sanctions outlined in the Charter to counter and reverse aggression – and it should be stressed that military enforcement is the ultimate measure on that rising scale of sanctions – is not an automatic or predictable formula to achieve the desired change in behaviour of leaders or states.

The issue of moving to the final sanction, to "take such actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security", as specified in Article 42, is inevitably made much more murky by the fact that prior action has never been taken to implement Articles 43 through 46 (negotiating advance arrangements for standby forces and other types of assistance to be available to the Council) or Article 47 (providing for the establishment of the Military Staff Committee to give support to the Council for military planning and operations). James' comment on the failure to prepare for Article 42 implementation, especially through advance agreements on standby forces, was an apt warning about the current situation:

"Clearly, their absence would not be fatal to the hope that the United Nations would be able to take strong measures in support of peace, for it would always be open to Member States to provide forces voluntarily and *ad hoc*. But from the point of view of a tidy and well-planned system, ready to meet all major contingencies with both speed and efficiency, it would obviously be desirable for the United Nations to know in advance what forces it could count on."<sup>4</sup>

Once embarked on the course laid out in the Charter – and this course was set on 2 August 1990 – there are grounds for honest differences and debates about how to apply these measures, how to assess the effect they are achieving, and when to intensify them. In making these decisions, too, both the Charter and practical realities dictate that the permanent members of the Security Council, and the principal contributors of forces, will have the dominant "say".