

be made to Kissinger. The communique on the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks the next day recorded that progress had been made on European matters.⁷⁶ Then, a fortnight after the announcement of Brezhnev's new position on the exchange of ideas, information, and contacts, Zhukov aimed a blistering attack against American advocates of freer movement of persons and ideas.⁷⁷ Arguing that it was the American "hawks" who were pushing this proposal, he stated that their aim was the ideological disarmament and subversion of the socialist countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. The Americans were not pursuing exchanges in a spirit of mutual respect and non-interference, and Brezhnev, he all but stated, was clearly mistaken in thinking that anything but disaster could come from concessions in this area. Moscow should have nothing to do with a Washington that was bent on securing an ideological "thaw" in the socialist countries, he inferred. Instead it should move ahead with its tried and tested policy of limited détente and divisive conciliation.

Whether Brezhnev intends to tilt Soviet decisions more definitely in a reform direction cannot of course be ascertained. But as he determines how far to go at the CSCE, much will depend on his ability to utilize the Central Committee and Secretariat to bolster his Politburo support and outmaneuver the opposition. The voting membership of the