

Would Canada's voice be listened to more seriously and would our words carry greater weight in the corridors of power around the world because we were no longer a member of the NATO Alliance? The answer to these questions remains unequivocally 'No'. Canada's possibilities for influencing these events would be greatly weakened and the stability of the East-West balance immeasurably shaken.<sup>3</sup>

In further comments, Mr. Weiner pointed out that making Canada a NWFZ would preclude the testing of the cruise missile, to which the Government is committed, and which it believes to be an important response to Soviet force modernization. This action would also mean the loss of jobs at places such as Litton Industries, which manufacture components for the cruise missile guidance system.

Finally, Mr. Weiner stated that the real answer to the nuclear problem lay in continued discussion and consultation:

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. They are a terrifying reality which political leadership must seek to constrain. Yet, a failure to incorporate a credible nuclear component within NATO's overall strategy would be an invitation to nuclear blackmail, with consequences too terrible to contemplate. In this sense, the real question before us is how we can best achieve policies which will reduce the recourse to nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

In an outline of defence and security issues affecting Canada, the Department of National Defence stated that declaring Canada a NWFZ

...would be seen by our allies as an attempt by Canada to exploit all the benefits of alliance membership without being prepared to share the obligations....Nuclear-free zones are not nuclear-safe ones....To argue that removing nuclear weapons or declaring oneself to be nuclear-free makes one's territory safe from nuclear threat is a cruel deception.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Commons Debates, 10 October 1985, p. 7575.

<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, Defence and Security Issues, January 1985, p. 5.