

25 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Working PaperVerification of Non-production: The case for Ad Hoc checks

1. According to the system developed by the Conference, verification of non-production should be carried out through exchanges of data and, in the case of Lists 1 and 2, through permanent or random on-site inspections. In this context, we should like to recall our proposals for the development of an effective and practicable system of data exchange, which were aimed at the establishment of an efficient reporting system (CD/CW/WP.159 dated 19 March 1987).

The graded intrusiveness of the verification measures is in line with the respective levels of relevance to a CW ban of the substances contained in Lists 1 to 3 and entails concentration of controls on the main areas. This approach should be adhered to in the interests of effective verification. The envisaged system is a suitable means of creating sufficient transparency regarding the use of the reported substances.

It was clear, however, from the outset that these controls could only bite if the comprehensive reporting obligations provided for in the text of the Convention were complied with. Hence, there could be grounds for concern that non-declared use of substances subject to controls under Article VI might remain undetected. Such violations of the Convention are conceivable in two types of facilities - on the one hand in facilities already covered on the basis of their reported use of other substances from Lists 2 and 3, and on the other hand in plants not reported as production facilities for controllable substances which have thus remained outside the system of verification provided for in Article VI.