

steamship line to deliver certain cargoes, and the steamship line is required to make the deliveries. The steamship line concludes direct agreements, and on the basis of these, formulates plans with an indication of the sectors involved. It then issues a summary State order in currency and tonnage to the ministry. For the remaining available tonnage, the MMF assigns a goal to the steamship line expressed in currency, with specific norms for contributions to the currency fund of the steamship line.

The system of evaluation indicators affecting bonuses is, in our view, inadequate. In circumstances where there are stable norms governing the division of the final results into a government share and a share for the collective, the collective has the right to dispose of its earnings itself. But the system of artificially created target indicators leads to attempts to adopt overdone plans at the beginning of the year so as not to be left without any bonuses. Why is it that the issue of awarding bonuses to first directors is decided by a superior organization instead of by, say, the labour collective council?

What you've been saying concerns relations with the ministry, but how are relations with local organs under the new conditions?

Alas, here 'perestroika' is proceeding slowly. It's the usual situation: Soviet and Party organs issue a decision to allocate equipment and people for, say, gathering the harvest or working on the land. Because we appreciate the need for this type of work, the steamship line takes steps to participate. But then the finance inspector comes along, from the very same local organs, and analyzes