be 'in no way hostile to belief in the being of God.' 'Religion,' Mr. Fairbairn remarks, 'is practically co-extensive with man; its presence, even among savage tribes, being the rule, its absence the exception.' How then did man become religious, and what was the earliest form of that religion? How can 'the practical universality and apparent necessity' of his Theism be explained? The philosophical position of our author is at once determined, when he proceeds to examine the solutions proposed for these enigmas. The derivation of the theistic idea from 'natural objects, dreams, or fears' he combats at the outset, as assuming the truth of an empirical philosophy and resolving religious ideas into impressions of sense, without explaining man's faculty or tendency to believe. The faculty or tendency is innate, although the occasion of its development is from without. 'If infant and dog, savage and monkey, alike think natural objects alive, the man does, the animal does not, formulate his thoughts into a religion. Why? If man can get out of the Fetich stage, he can also get into it. Why? Faith is not the result of sensations. Mind is not passive, but active, in the formation of beliefs. The constitutive element is what mind brings to nature, not what nature brings to mind; otherwise no spiritual and invisible could be conceived.' (p. 21). But Mr. Fairbairn rejects the supernatural theory as well as the natural. 'A primitive revelation,' he says, 'were a mere assumption, incapable of proof—capable of the most positive disproof. Although often advanced in the supposed interests of religion, the principle it assumes is most irreligious. If man is dependant on an outer revelation for his idea of God, then he must have what Schelling happily termed "an original Atheism of consciousness." Religion cannot, in that case, be rooted in the nature of man—must be implanted from without. The theory that would derive religion from a revelation is as bad as the theory that would derive it from distempered dreams. Revelation may satisfy or rectify, but cannot create a religious capacity or instinct.' (p. 22). Our author then proceeds to an examination of the subject by the historic method. Having assumed the original unity of the Indo-European family, he traces the origin of Theism back necessarily through language. The similarity of the general term for God in all the languages of this group of nations proves that the idea had taken firm root before the various members of the family had dispersed. Now, what is the meaning of that general term? Simply *di*, to shine; man, therefore, looked to the heavens, and found Deity therein or concealed behind the azure canopy. Into the philological branch of the subject Mr. Fairbairn enters at considerable length, and brings some rather cogent arguments to prove that the farther back we go, the fewer were the gods, instead of being more numerous. The Indo-European God was not a fetich, or an idol-god. 'The God of our fathers was no ghost of a deceased ancestor seen in feverish dreams.' 'To Indo-European men, Heaven and God were one, not a thing but a person, whose *Thou* stood over against his *I*. His life was one, the life above him was one too. Then that life was generative, productive, the source of every other life, and so to express his full conception, he called the living Heaven, Diespiter, Dyaushpitar—Heaven-Father. (p. 43.) Then follows a most interesting attempt to trace out, by the aid of language and literature, the development of this idea through all its vicissitudes down the stream of time.

The second paper treats of 'Theism and Scientific Speculation.' The conflict between science and religion is one of the most important with which the present generation has to deal. Mr. Fairbairn metes out to each of the belligerent parties its own share of blame. It is his opinion that religion and science cannot properly be in antithesis, although theology and science easily may, and perhaps always will, be at war. 'Religion,' he observes, 'is a permanent and universal characteristic of man, a normal and necessary product of his nature. He grows into religion, but works into theology, *feels* himself into the one, *thinks* himself into the other. He is religious by nature, theological by art.' Conciliation by the division of the respective provinces of religion and science he regards as impossible, nor will peace be secured by conquest. After an earnest protest against the bitterness with which the controversy is conducted on both sides, Mr. Fairbairn proceeds to examine the chief causes of this untoward conflict. In the first place, 'our present theistic contests and perils arise, in great part, from changes effected, or being effected, in our cosmic conceptions.' In short, teleology, or the evidence from design, is the *bete noire* of modern science. 'Theism is represented as an anthropomorphic theory of creation, "process of manufacture" by "a manlike artificer."' In speaking on this point, our author is unusually severe upon Mr. Herbert Spencer, yet there is no portion of the book more attractive than that in which the true parentage of teleology is pointed out. Mr. Fairbairn shows that neither the Hebrew nor Buddhist theory sanctions the idea of 'a process of manufacture.' The real originators of it were the Greeks, from whom it passed to the Christian Fathers and the Schoolmen. In other words, it did not make its appearance as a theological, but as a scientific and philosophical dogma. In England, it was the offspring of the Royal Society, from which, through Boyle or Derham, it passed to Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises. Passing on to the evolution theory,