

House of Lords (Lords Halsbury, L.C., Watson and Davey), however, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal holding that the mortgagor cannot by an assignment of the equity of redemption intercept the right of consolidation, and that the assignee stands in the same position as the mortgagor himself would have done had there been no assignment. *Vint v. Paget*, 2 D. & J. 611, was therefore approved and followed. Lord Davey thus states the result of the decision: "If your lordships affirm the decree now under appeal, the doctrine of consolidation will be confined within at least intelligible limits. It will be applicable where at the date when redemption is sought all the mortgages are united in one hand and redeemable by the same person, or where after that state of things has once existed the equities of redemption have become separated. If the purchaser of two or more equities of redemption desire to prevent consolidation, he has it in his power to redeem any one mortgage before consolidation takes place; but if for his own convenience he delays doing so, he runs the same risk as the mortgagor ran of the mortgages becoming united by transfer in one hand."

TRADE NAME—NAME INDICATING MANUFACTURER—DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE—
IMITATION—INTENTION TO DECEIVE—FRAUD—PASSING OFF GOODS AS THOSE
MADE BY ANOTHER—INJUNCTION.

Reddaway v. Banham, (1896) A.C. 199, was an action to restrain the defendants from calling goods manufactured by them "camel-hair belting," on the ground that by doing so they were passing off their goods as goods manufactured by the plaintiffs. The goods in question were belts made of camel hair, and it appeared by the evidence that the plaintiffs had for fourteen years manufactured camel-hair belting, and "camel-hair belting" was known in the trade as the belting manufactured by the plaintiffs and no others. The defendants had recently begun the manufacture of a similar kind of belting, and had also called it camel-hair belting, and it was found by the jury that camel-hair belting was known as the distinguishing name of the goods manufactured by the plaintiffs and no others, and that the defendants' goods were similarly named for the purpose of deceiving and did deceive