

under one million people. It then immediately broke the criterion by including Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and Papua-New Guinea — admittedly because these three states demonstrated many of the characteristics of “smallness” and maintained “integral links” with the small states of their areas. The reader might comfortably assume that the “special” problems as described are by no means limited to states of minuscule population size.

Finally there are a number of issues which for more obvious reasons could not be thoroughly examined in this attempt to find common denominators. For instance, the question of intervention could be dealt with only elliptically in the report. How could it be possible to discuss the issue of “just” intervention in the case of the Caribbean, when a hemisphere away the intervention of South Africa in the affairs of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana had produced so much internal confusion and international indignation?

### Security is collective, if you're small

The report has therefore gently sidestepped many important issues in the attempt to achieve a political consensus, and a working typology. It has premised small state security on two principles: deterrence and stability through development. In the first instance it has argued persuasively that collective security arrangements among small states, but supported in some form or fashion by neighboring powers (and there is a distinct preference towards sympathetic, Commonwealth regional powers), are the most effective means of providing for the security requirements of small states. There is an unwritten assumption that very little independent action can be taken if a small state offends, or is subject to a aggression by a larger regional power.

Second, since many of the threats to small state security are, at least in inception, internal, the question of development is inextricably linked to issues of stability, since no state can be both poor and secure. While this is a comfortable assumption it may not always stand up to analysis. A glaring hemispheric example of its fallibility is Haiti, which, as the poorest country in the western hemisphere, enjoyed a period of prolonged stability under the first Duvalier that contrasted oddly with the bombastic political turbulence of its wealthier neighbor, the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that a country has a somewhat better chance at stability if its citizens are relatively comfortably endowed.

### Caribbean applications

More importantly, what is the relevance of the study to the Caribbean, where all the trouble started in the first place? First, to put the recommendations — in particular those pertaining to regional cooperation — in context, it must be noted that the only fully independent small states of the Caribbean are those of the Commonwealth and Suriname. The many other tiny islands of the Caribbean have all yet to attain full sovereign independence, for there is still an active metropolitan (American, British, Dutch and French) presence in the area.

There are longstanding traditions of regional cooperation in the Commonwealth Caribbean, fostered originally by a common history and culture and a parsimonious colonial administration which saw the cost-effectiveness of regional arrangements. These traditions were reinforced and substantially developed after independence by regional politicians and senior bureaucrats who saw the value of quickening the cause of regional cooperation as the best possible mechanism for confronting the external environment and for tackling the

Geography of the Caribbean

