

One important by-product of this period was that by 1970 some of the threatened began to suspect that the hijackings, random massacres and assassination of foreign officials might represent an entirely new wave of revolutionary violence.

Terrorism Takes Hold: 1967-73

In September 1970 the PFLP orchestrated a triple hijacking at Dawson Field in Jordan, involving a Pan-American 747, a Swissair DC8, and a T.W.A. 707. On September 12 all three planes were blown up on Jordanian territory. At this point King Hussein cracked down on the PLO killing many and ejecting others. Thus was born an instrument of revenge — Black September — which greatly intensified Palestinian terrorism. 1971 was a growth year since the IRA opened up a campaign of sniping, bombing and arson in Northern Ireland. In the same year the ETA Basque began overt operations, the Bretons took to terrorism, the Croats shot the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden, and in December the Baader-Meinhof gang made their first bank raid.

Much worse was to come. In 1972 and early 1973 three devastating events occurred at Lod, Munich and Khartoum. At Lod airport in Israel in May 1972 four Japanese Red Army terrorists opened fire on mostly Puerto Rican pilgrims. Twenty-four were killed and seventy-six persons injured. The one remaining terrorist later testified that he believed he would become one of the stars of Orion. At Munich in September 1972 the Palestinians staged an act which they were sure would rivet world attention upon them. They captured 11 Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village who then died in the badly-timed shootout between terrorists and West German police. The "Munich Massacre" had a devastating impact upon world opinion. The third event took place in Khartoum in March 1973 with the Black September capture of American Ambassador Cleo Noel, his second in command and the Belgian Chargé. Fearing an attack from the Sudanese police the terrorists killed all three men and were seen licking the men's blood from the ground. The next year at Maalot in Israel another shattering shootout took place. The terrorists were on top.

Western Response

As Bowyer-Bell has pointed out, those responsible for dealing with terrorists in the West acted with only limited guidelines, under great pressure, without adequate information and with uncertain aid from their governments. In spite of public indignation that terrorists could strike with such impunity, the Western response was feeble and *ad hoc*. The years 1974 and 1976 were the worst for terrorist incidents, there being over 380 attacks each year, and over 1,000 deaths in 1974 alone. Quickly, new crisis-management techniques had to be developed such as SWAT teams in the US, the British SAS teams and the German GSG9. Airport security was tightened with costly monitoring devices for all air passengers. Psychological profiles of terrorists had to be worked out, sky marshalls were put on planes, whilst on the ground hostage-negotiation teams included doctors, diplomats, psychologists, policemen and psychiatrists.

It was not until June 1975 that the West was able to strike back. In what is now a celebrated rescue event,

Israeli commandos flew to Entebbe airport in Uganda to free a plane load of predominantly Jewish passengers hijacked earlier by a mixed terrorist gang including the Baader-Meinhof. Encouraged by the Israeli success, the Dutch finally took a tough stand with South Moluccan terrorists holed up in a train near Achen. In 1977 they took an even tougher stand, effectively ending South Moluccan violence. The terrorist networks appeared to strike back with the OPEC oil ministers kidnapping, but this event, led by Carlos, was really not aimed at the West.

In October 1977 hijacking was dealt a decisive blow at Mogodishu, Somalia, when the German GSG9 units, using stun-grenades (of British make), managed to end a tense hostage situation by storming the plane and killing or capturing the terrorists. A combination of new technologies, international cooperation, (the Somali authorities unexpectedly helped the Germans) and new counter-terrorist forces began to turn the tide in favour of prevention. By 1976 there were over 350 terrorists languishing in Western jails.

Undoubtedly, the attitudes of Western powers towards the problem played a significant role in terrorist control. The Israelis always retaliated over terrorism, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". The French and the Dutch gradually moved to a "no compromise" position after humiliating experiences. The Swedes, Germans and Americans all embraced "flexibility", until they too realized that only "no compromise" would bring real results. The Greeks, Italians and Austrians (Chancellor Kreisky) have believed in "concession and accommodation", and it is not surprising that terrorism has continued to flourish in their territories. Terrorism did not cease in 1978, it continued strongly, changing emphasis to kidnapping, bombing and political assassinations. At least now the pattern of terror and counter-terror is established and the parameters of the problem are clear for all to see. Wilkinson reports that from January 1968 to December 1978 there were 4,888 international terrorist incidents of which 42% were explosive bombings, 14% arson and incendiary, 12% shooting and ambush, 11% assassinations and 10% hijacks.

The Terrorist Profile: What Is He Like?

In an article in *Terrorism*, 1976, Charles Russell and Bowman Miller analysed data from several hundred terrorists from 18 different groups to develop a terrorist profile. The eight categories they used were age, sex, marital status, rural versus urban origin, social and economic background, education or occupation, method/place of recruitment and political philosophy. The resulting picture of the terrorist was surprising and disturbing. Urban terrorists seem to be gaining recruits from increasingly younger age groups. Here is the composite picture found by Russell and Miller. The terrorists "have been largely single males aged 22-24 . . . who have some university education, if not a college degree. The female terrorists . . . are preoccupied with support rather than operational roles. More often than not, these urban terrorists come from affluent, urban, middle-class families, many of whom enjoy considerable social prestige. Like their parents before them, many of the older terrorists have been trained for the medical, legal, engineering and teaching professions, among others, and may have practised these occupations prior to their com-