the power. But what is to prevent them from enforcing it? Suppose we had a conservative majority here, and a reform majority aboveor a conservative majority above and a reform majority here—all elected under party obligations, -what is to prevent a dead-lock between the chambers? It may be called unconstitutional-but what is to prevent the Councillors (especially if they feel that in the dispute of the hour they have the country at their back) from practically exercising all the powers that belong to us? They might amend our money bills, they might throw out all our bills if they liked, and bring to a stop the whole machinery of government. And what could we do to prevent them? But, even supposing this were not the case, and that the elective Upper House continued to be guided by that discretion which has heretofore actuated its proceedings, still, I think, we must all feel that the election of members for such enormous districts as form the constituencies of the Upper House has become a great practical inconvenience. I say this from personal experience, having long taken an active interest in the electoral contests in Upper Canada, We have found greater difficulty in inducing candidates to offer for seats in the Upper House, than in getting ten times the number for the Lower House. The constituencies are wast, that it is difficult to find gentlemen who have the will to incur the labor of such a contest, who are sufficiently known andpopular enough throughout districts so wide, and who have money enough - (hear) - to pay the enormous bills, not incurred in any corrupt way, -do not fancy that I mean that for a moment—but the bills that are sent in after the contest is over, and which the candidates are compelled to pay if they ever hope to present themselves for re-election. hears) But honorable gentlemen say-" This is all very well, but you are taking an important power out of the hands of the people, which they now possess." Now this is a We do not propose to do anything mistake. of the sort. What we propose is, that the Upper House shall be appointed from the best men of the country by those holding the contilence of the representatives of the people in this Chamber. It is proposed that the Government of the day, which only lives by the approval of this Chamber, shall make the appointments, and be responsible to the people for the selections they shall make. (Hear, hear.) Not a single appointment could be made, with regard to which the Government would not be open to consure, and which the

representatives of the people, in this House, would not have an opportunity of condemning. For myself, I have maintained the appointed principle, as in opposition to the elective, ever since I came into public life, and have never hesitated, when before the people, to state my opinions in the broadest manner; and yet not in a single instance have I ever found a constituency in Upper Canada, or a public meeting declaring its disapproval of appointment by the Crown and its desire for election by the people at large. When the change was made in 1855 there was not a single petition from the people asking for it it was in a manner forced on the Legislature. The real reason for the change was, that before Responsible Government was introduced finto this country, while the old oligarchical system existed, the Upper House continuously and systematically was at war with the popular branch, and threw out every measure of a liberal tendency. The result was, that in the famous ninety-two resolutions the introduction of the elective principle into the Upper House was, declared to be indispensable. So long as Mr. ROBERT BALDWIN remained in public life, the thing could not be done; but when he left, the deed was consummated. But it is said, that if the members are to be appointed for lift, the number should be unlimitedthat, in the event of a dead lock arising between that chamber and this, there should be power to overcome the difficulty by the appointment of more members. Well, under the British system, in the case of a legislative union, that might be a legitimate, provision. But honorable gentlemen must see that the limitation of the numbers in the Upper House lies at the base of the whole compact on which this scheme rests. (Hear, hear.) It is perfectly clear, as was contended by those who represented Lower Canada in the Conference, that if the number of the Legislative Councillors was made capable of increase, you would thereby sweep away the whole protection they had from the Upper Chamber. But it has been said that, though you may not give the power to the Executive to increase the numbers of the Upper House, in the event of a dead lock, you might limit the term for which the members are appointed. I was myself in favor of that proposition. 1 thought it would be well to provide for a more frequent change in the composition of the Upper House, and lessen the danger of the chamber being largely composed of gentlemen whose advanced years might forbid the punctual and vigorous discharge of their public