

(b) You will realize that much has been left to the initiative of our delegations in Vienna during phase (a) and that the smoothness and success of phase (b) will depend much upon your efforts.

(c) We shall hope to have your further comments and suggestions regarding tactics at the conference, candidates for chairmanships, etc.

681.

DEA/14001-2-6-40

*Le chef des Relations extérieures de l'Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée.  
à la 1<sup>ère</sup> Direction économique*

*Head, External Relations, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited,  
to Economic (1) Division*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, June 22, 1960

Attention: Miss H. D. Burwash

Dear Miss Burwash:

Your telegram No. 832 of June 17 to Vienna raises two matters on which we have some comments.

Paragraph II of page 4 mentions the possibility that Canada might ask its partners in bilateral agreements if they will accept administration of safeguards through the Agency. We have no objection to this and, in fact, we feel there may be advantages in delegating this somewhat onerous task to some non-Canadian organization. Canada should, of course, be careful not to make an announcement at the General Conference without first consulting the various signatories.

In this connection I attach an extract from a monthly newsletter issued in Washington which indicates that the U.S. is meeting with very little success in persuading its bilateral partners to channel not only safeguards but also general co-operation through Vienna. In Canada's case, the idea of carrying out via the Agency the entire co-operation under any of its bilateral agreements is not particularly applicable, and probably not acceptable to some people. Therefore, I assume we are interested only in transferring the administration of safeguards.

The second point is raised in your paragraph III: namely, whether Canada will consider opening some of its facilities to Agency inspection. As you are aware, under no circumstances could we open the NRX and NRU reactors at Chalk River to Agency inspection while we are selling plutonium to the U.S. and the U.K. This is expected to continue for many years. We are doubtful that selective inspection at Chalk River or in Canada carries much moral weight. If your Department is strongly in favour of applying safeguards to some Canadian facilities, I suggest that the matter be discussed with Mr. J.L. Gray.

Yours sincerely,

J.W. GREENWOOD