

Eisenhower asked that Green discuss the matter with American officials at the annual meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence, held that year in Montebello, Quebec. The discussions (Documents 302, 586, 587) served only to highlight the differences between American and Canadian appraisals of the situation. Arnold Heeneey, Canada's ambassador to the United States, later identified the Montebello meeting as a crucial turning-point in Canada-US relations during the Diefenbaker years.² A joint attempt at mediation by Canada, Mexico and Brazil was firmly rejected by Washington. In October, the Americans imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba. From Havana, Canadian ambassador Allan Anderson expressed his "concern over [the] position gradually emerging in which Canada begins to appear as 'the fair haired boy' in high favour with [the] Cuban Government." Anderson's fears were well founded: by December 1960, American resentment of Canada's continued and growing trade with Cuba was high.

As Green pointed out in his foreword to the annual report, despite the intensification of East-West conflicts in all parts of the globe, events during 1960 "fell short of a full-scale revival of the cold war. Contacts with the Soviet bloc, though reduced, were not entirely abandoned." Canadian politicians and diplomats strove to keep channels of communication open. Shortly before the summit, Minister of Trade and Commerce Gordon Churchill travelled to Moscow to sign an extension of the 1955 trade agreement with the USSR, and reported in glowing terms on the friendly reception he received (Document 504). Even after the failure of the Paris conference, Ambassador Johnson had cordial conversations with Soviet leaders (Documents 505, 506), in which he expressed Canada's hope for expanded trade and cultural relations. The issue of Russian-born Canadian citizens who had returned to the USSR and been detained there against their wishes was at least partially resolved.

In a rather ironic contrast, Canada's relations with its chief Western ally, the United States, showed a marked deterioration during 1960. Bilateral political discussions between the two countries were dominated by the issue of nuclear weapons. In Canada, opinions on the matter differed sharply. Green, supported by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson, was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces, while Minister of National Defence George Pearkes and Clerk of the Privy Council Robert Bryce favoured continued close co-operation with the Americans on military matters. In January 1960, diametrically opposing arguments were presented by Bryce and by D. B. Dewar, also of the Privy Council Office. According to Bryce, "prompt action" should be taken, and would be welcomed by the Canadian public (Document 242). Dewar, on the other hand, argued that the country was "going through a period of uncertainty about its defence policy and programmes. This uncertainty has not perhaps reached the point where we could be said to have a crisis about defence policy, but there is not much likelihood that the problem will grow smaller in the coming months and

² Arnold Heeneey, *The Things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant*, ed. Brian D. Heeneey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 162-63.